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TAX REFORM AND THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971:
LESIONS, LAGNIAPPES AND LESSONS
PAUL R. MCDANIEL*
I. FOREWORDt
The Revenue Act of 1971 produced for the cause of tax reform a
number of wounds (some serious, some minor), a few small gifts, and
some valuable lessons. Predictably, where new tax preferences were
introduced—or old ones reinstated—as incentives or subsidies for
particular types of economic behavior, the familiar process of integrat-
ing these financial benefits into the economic life of the country began
promptly. Tax advisors for the individuals or corporations benefited by
the tax preferences quickly moved to analyze the provisions and formu-
late the adjustments in business practices and methods of operation
necessary to facilitate use of such preferences as the investment credit,
the asset depreciation range (ADR) system that accelerates deprecia-
tion for qualifying assets, the work incentive program (WIN) tax
credit, and the special provisions for "domestic international sales
corporations" (DISC) Law review articles, tax institute programs,
trade newsletters, and the like all reflect the skill and facility with
which lawyers, accountants, economists, and business advisors put these
provisions to work for their clients. Similarly, in those few areas where
the 1971 Act limited the availability of tax preferences, the necessary
shifts and adjustments in business practice were made, often with the
effect, as will be seen below, that the use of the tax preferences simply
shifted to different groups of taxpayers who were unaffected by the
limits as drafted. Here, too, the literature is plentiful.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
t As this article was going to press, the Department of the Treasury released its
Proposals for Tax Change (April 30, 1973). Rather than revising the body of the article,
it appeared more useful to examine the Treasury's proposals in light of the text dis-
cussion as originally drafted and to make some preliminary comparisons between the
recommendations advanced herein and those of the Treasury. A discussion of the
Treasury's proposals is therefore deferred to an Afterword, p. 852 infra.
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The articles in this issue move beyond a technical analysis of the
Revenue Act of 1971. They focus rather on the Act in terms of its
implications for tax reform. They analyze major provisions of the Act
by drawing our attention to the forces that operated to produce them,
the impact of those measures on tax equity, and their economic and
social justifications, real or fanciful.
Of the lesions referred to in the title of this article, the most serious
setbacks to tax reform efforts were created by the provisions providing
capital recovery allowances for industry: the restored 7% investment
credit' and the ADR system' with its accompanying class lives repair
allowance system. Professors Brannon and Taubman discuss the ex-
traordinarily weak economic arguments advanced by the Treasury on
behalf of these provisions!' The Democratic members of Congress, how-
ever, proved unable or unwilling to develop a coherent and organized
set of responses, either on economic or tax equity grounds, to those
arguments. From the standpoint of tax reform, passage of the invest-
ment credit and ADR raises serious equity issues at the corporate level,
producing tax disparities between capital intensive and labor intensive
business, and between classes of corporations—primarily commercial
banks—that can use these special benefits as tax shelter devices and
those that cannot. At the individual level, the introduction of ADR
added an alternative to the various five-year rapid amortization provi-
sions which high-bracket taxpayers could utilize in tax shelter equip-
ment leasing devices, and resulted in a corresponding adverse impact on
the equity of the progressive individual income tax.
The introduction of the WIN tax credit" and the provision for
rapid amortization of on-the-job training facilities5 were of lesser
impact in terms of the revenue involved, but nonetheless ran counter to
the interest of tax reform. These new "tax expenditures" were adopted,
as has been Congress' wont, without any studies that would measure
their effectiveness or efficiency as compared to federal programs pro-
viding direct financial assistance to place low-income individuals in
productive employment. For example, Congress never asked even such
a basic question as why it wanted to encourage employment of those
individuals only in profit-making
 industries and not in government or in
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 46-48, 50.
2 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(m).
See Brannon, The Revenue Act of 1971—Do Tax Incentives Have New Life?,
14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 891 (1973); Taubman, The Investment Tax Credit, Once
More, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 871 (1973).
4 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, I§ 50A, B.
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 188.
6 The term "tax expenditure" in this article is used in the sense developed in Surrey,
Tax Incentives—Conceptual Criteria for Identification and Comparison with Direct Gov-
ernment Expenditures, in Tax Institute of America, Symposium on Tax Incentives 3
(1971).
814
TAX REFORM, TAX SHELTERS AND TAX PREFERENCES
tax-exempt activities such as hospitals or educational institutions; by
definition, the tax credit and the amortization provision that it enacted
are usable only by employers with a business profit that generates tax
liability. Professor Brannon observes that these provisions may consti-
tute part of a passing fad, but Congress' willingness to rush in with a
tax preference to meet each new social or economic problem that en-
gages the attention of the country does not bode well for tax reform
efforts. Too much time and effort are diverted in attempts to eliminate
these aberrations from the Code—time and effort that should be devoted
to basic research and education on the more fundamental problems
created by the major tax preference provisions.
The adoption in the 1971 Act of the Nixon Administration's DISC
proposal,' a measure which in general permits qualified corporations
to defer the tax on one-half of their export income, caused a third lesion
in the side of tax reform. As Professor Brannon's article suggests, the
justifications offered by Treasury officials for DISC were so embarras-
singly weak as to be humorous, were it not for the fact that as a result
of this measure taxpayers either paid some $170 million in additional
taxes in 1971 or had to forego government services that such funds
would otherwise have provided. DISC represented a pure windfall to
corporate exporters, since there was no requirement that they increase
their exports to qualify for the Treasury largesse. And, while we are
relatively accustomed to the process by which private financial advisors
promote the use of tax preferences, it has been somewhat disconcerting
to see the Treasury shouldering aside private advisors to become the
foremost purveyor and advocate of this new tax loophole.'
Some minor contusions caused by the 1971 Act may be noted. The
exceptions to the restrictions in industrial development bonds were
expanded.' While the 1971 changes were relatively small, the movement
was in the wrong direction. What is needed is elimination of the exemp-
tions from the industrial development rules, not expansion. For ex-
ample, investment bankers predict that the dollar volume of bonds
issued under the exemption for pollution control facilities" alone will
equal in 1974 the total of all industrial development bonds issued in
1968," the year in which Congress responded with section 103(c)
to the pressures created on the municipal bond market by the volume
of industrial development bonds.
The revisions in section 214—the deduction for household services
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 991-97.
8 See U.S. Treasury Dep't, DISC: A Handbook for Exporters (1972).
See Staff of Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
General Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1971, at 75-76 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
General Explanation].
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 103(c)(4)(F).
11 N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1972, 4 F, at 13.
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and child care expenditures—serve as a useful transition from lesions to
lagniappes. As the article in this issue by Professor Klein" illustrates,
it is a complex matter to decide whether the child care provision repre-
sents a tax expenditure or an attempt to work out a structural problem
within the income tax system. Proponents of the 1971 changes were by
and large thinking in tax expenditure terms." Viewed in such terms, the
1971 actions regarding child care programs provide a classic illustration
of the inconsistency with which Congress deals with direct expenditure
and tax expenditure programs. As a tax expenditure program, section
214 provides the greatest financial beneft to taxpayers with $18,000
adjusted gross income. The benefits decrease with income as a function
of lower marginal rates; and, for the mother or father who heads a
family of three children and earns $4300 per year or less, the tax
expenditure provision provides no federal assistance at all. Yet in the
same session in which section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code was
expanded, Congress also passed a direct program of federal financial
aid for child care." Under this program, 100 percent of day care costs
were provided for poverty-level families—the group to whom the tax
system gives no help at all—and the federal aid decreased as family
income increased—again, precisely the opposite of the tax expenditure
program. Indeed, it was apparently contemplated that benefits under
the direct assistance program would be phased out entirely at about
$10,000 of income—the level at which the tax benefits begin to produce
a substantial financial benefit."
Advocates of still further liberalization of section 214 seem to have
changed their view of the provision and now regard it primarily as a
structural provision intended to provide the mechanics for deducting a
cost of producing income.' It is true that if the child care deduction has
any rational place in the Code, it must be regarded as a cost of produc-
ing income. However, as Professor Klein's article points out, much
research and analysis remain to be done before the appropriate dimen-
sions of such a deduction can be developed. Viewed as a tax expenditure
measure the 1971 changes in the child care deduction were unfortunate;
if those changes, however, prove to be the cause for more reflective
consideration of the nature of expenditures for child care within an in-
come tax system, the congressional action may rate a qualified plus.
12 Klein, Tax Deductions for Family-Care Expenses, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
917 (1973).
12 See 117 Cong. Rec. S18,550-55 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1971).
14 5. 2007, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The bill was vetoed by the President.
15 See 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation
641-44 (1972).
10 See, e.g., H.R. 1442, 93d Cong., 1st Sess (1973), allowing expenses for household
help as a deduction from gross income.
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The gifts laid at the altar of tax reform in the 1971 Act were
meager indeed when compared with the lesions discussed above. None-
theless, as Professor Brannon's comments indicate, that Congress took
action insuring that poverty-level persons will not be required to pay
income tax is a hopeful sign?' The acceleration of the increase in the
standard deduction" may be viewed as constructive both in terms of
simplification of the tax system and as a reform reducing the disparity
between persons claiming the standard deduction and those itemizing
personal deductions." Finally, in what surely must have been regarded
as a reform measure by Congress, individual investor-lessors were gen-
erally denied the opportunity to utilize the reinstated investment
credit." This provision was intended to preclude use of the credit in
syndicated equipment leasing tax shelter programs?' Whether the over-
all effect of the provision has proved beneficial is a matter considered
in greater detail below.
There are valuable lessons to be learned by tax reformers from the
experience in 1971. The primary lesson, one we learned long ago but
which was reinforced by the process that produced the 1971 Act, is
that the Treasury can wield immense power—especially when forcefully
backed by the White House—to secure adoption of its views by
Congress when it is advocating measures that constitute tax preferences
for particular economic activities. The reinstatement of the investment
credit is a useful example. In 1969, when Senators Harris, Kennedy,
and others proposed suspension or repeal of the investment credit,"
repeal was easily accomplished once the Nixon Administration took the
same position. But in 1971, when the Administration was seeking
reinstatement of the credit, Senator Nelson could muster only a hand-
ful of votes for an amendment that would have placed a  limit on the
17
 The low-income allowance was Increased to $1300, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 141
(c). Coupled with the personal exemption of $750 per person, the level of tax-exempt
income for family units of varying sizes closely approximates federal poverty level
figures. See General Explanation, supra note 9, at 49-51.
18 The maximum standard deduction is 15% of adjusted gross income, with a ceiling
of $2000. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 141(6).
19
 An additional reform relating to the standard deduction is provided in Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, 141(c), which denies use of the standard deduction by a dependent to
offset unearned income. This action puts some limits on wealthy individuals who set up
grantor trusts designed to spin off an amount of income to each dependent approximately
equal to the amount of income that a single individual can receive free of tax. Prior to
the 1971 amendment, the figure was $1750 (the then $1000 low-income allowance plus
$750 personal exemption). A restriction similar to 0 141(c) would appear in order for
the personal exemption under § 151. Receipt of tax-free income from a trust by offspring
of wealthy parents is consistent neither with the purpose of the low-income allowance
nor with that of the personal exemption.
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(d)(3).
21 General Explanation, supra note 9, at 40-41.
22
 See 115 Cong. Rec. 9170 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Harris).
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amount of investment that could qualify for the investment credit's
DISC is another example of the Treasury's effectiveness. The Treasury
had initially tried to ease the DISC proposal through the Senate Finance
Committee, without any public hearings, on the last day of its executive
sessions on the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Frustrated in this attempt by
Senator Gore, the Treasury tried once more in 1970,24 but again was
beaten back. But in 1971, the tax reform forces in Congress were
simply unable to withstand continued Treasury persistence and pres-
sure.
The converse of the lesson, of course, is the inability of Congress
to enact major tax reforms over the opposition of the Treasury, indeed
perhaps in the absence of active assistance from the Treasury. Since
1969 the present Treasury's efforts have been largely devoted to advo-
cating further tax preferences rather than tax reform." Given the
experience in 1971, one cannot be optimistic that Congress can generate
major tax reform on its own initiative.'
This analysis, if correct, permits certain implications to be drawn
for a strategy of tax reform over the next two years. The House Ways
and Means Committee has concluded its Panel Discussions and Hearings
on Tax Reform." Presumably the topics selected for the Panel Discus-
sions represent those areas where reform is seen as most necessary and/
or most likely Reform in the nine income tax areas28 covered in the
23 117 Cong. Rec. 518,488-96 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1971). The amendment was de-
feated by a vote of 53-13.
24 The measure passed the House, but not the Senate. See H. Rep. No. 91-1435,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970).
25 Reportedly much of the present Treasury's efforts at tax "reform" have been
devoted to developing new tax expenditures to provide property tax relief for the elderly
and tuition assistance for parents of children in private schools. See, however, p. 852 infra.
26 Some might argue that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 resulted from congressional
initiative. While the Ways and Means Committee did commence the legislative process
on its own, I suggest that the emergence of a bill resulted from two actions by the exec-
utive branch: (1) the publication of the U.S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform Studies
and Proposals (House Ways and Means Comm. and Senate Finance Comm., 9151 Cong.,
1st Sess.) (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Studies]; and (2) the
adoption of many of the 1968 Treasury Proposals by the Nixon Administration in 1969.
The 1968 Studies gave Congress the research and background material so necessary to
effect significant tax reform, material that to date the tax-writing committees have not
shown an ability to develop on their Own.
27 The formal statements of the members of the eleven panels have been published
by the House Ways and Means Committee; see Prepared Statements Submitted by Wit-
nesses Invited to Appear Before the Committee on Ways and Means to Participate in
Panel Discussions on Tax Reform, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Panel No. --J. Useful summaries of the panelists' prepared statements are contained in
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 93d Cong., 1st Seas., Summary
of Testimony of Panelists on Tax Reform Topics (Comm. Print 1973).
ss The eleven panels treated nine income tax areas. Panel No. 1 (Feb. 5, 1973) supra
note 27, covered in broad terms "Objectives and Approaches to Tax Reform and Simpli-
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Panel Discussions is certainly needed, but a realistic appraisal of those
areas indicates that the prospects for significant reform may well be
limited to only two.
As to the most important tax preferences—capital gains (Panel
No. 2), accelerated depreciation, the investment credit, and the various
rapid amortization provisions (Panel No. 3), real estate (Panel No. 4),
percentage depletion and the intangible drilling and development ex-
pense deduction (Panel No. 9), and the tax rules for farm operations
(Panel No. 5)—the Treasury is firmly on record not only as being op-
posed to elimination of these items, but as sponsoring many of them.
Accordingly Treasury opposition can be expected with respect to any
proposals for direct curtailment or elimination of these tax preferences.
Thus if my conclusions from the congressional experience in 1971 are
correct, there is little realistic possibility that substantial direct reform
in these areas will be achieved in the next two years.
In the area of pension and profit-sharing plans (Panel No. 7),
substantial work has been done by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee. However, the likelihood of reform with respect to the tax
provisions governing employee benefit plans appears slight. This con-
clusion is based on this writer's view that the Nixon Administration's
proposals in this area move in the wrong direction, i.e. toward additional
tax preferences instead of rigorous examination of the present tax ex-
penditure provisions."
The area of taxation of income from foreign business operations
will presumably be reviewed in connection with the Congressional
consideration of the President's trade proposals. Again, however, the
Nixon Administration has taken a strong stand against any major re-
form of the tax treatment of foreign income."
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that there are only two
areas considered in the Panel Discussions that represent likely candi-
dates for congressionally initiated tax reform.si The first of these con-
fication." Panel No. 10 (Feb. 27, 1973) was devoted to "Estate and Gift Tax Revision,"
a subject not included in this discussion.
20
 See the Administration's proposals at 119 Cong. Rec. H2596-97 (daily ed. April 11,
1973). For a persuasive and detailed criticism of the Administration's recommendations,
see Statement of Prof. Daniel I. Halperin, in Panel No. 7 (Feb. 22, 1973), supra note 27.
80 See 119 Cong. Rec. H2556 (daily ed. April 10, 1973).
al A third area of tax reform may be achieved if Congress enacts the proposed fed-
eral subsidy for taxable bonds issued by state and local governments. See statements in
Panel No. 8 (Feb. 23, 1973), supra note 27. Since the tax exemption of I) 103 is not
directly removed by such a measure, I have not included it in the category of direct tax
reform measures likely to be enacted. The proposed federal subsidy for taxable bonds
does provide, however, an example of the utility of achieving tax reform by introducing
direct financial assistance programs as alternatives to tax expenditures. The hope in the
case of the subsidy, of course, is that the federally subsidized taxable bonds will prove
so attractive to state and local governments that tax-exempt bonds will die a natural death.
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terns tax shelters and the second is the minimum tax. I suggest them
as prime candidates for significant reform by virtue of my reading of
the lessons learned in 1971." Curtailing of tax shelter operations
appears possible for two reasons: one, Congress appears aware of and
willing to take action with respect to tax shelters, as evidenced by its
1971 action largely limiting the investment credit to corporate lessors;
two, the Nixon Treasury, while favoring the underlying provisions that
give rise to tax shelter devices, has not made any effort to defend the
shelter arrangements themselves.
Action to strengthen the minimum tax—which can be viewed both
independently and as one response to the tax shelter problem—also
appears possible. The basic study on the concept of a minimum tax was
done by the Treasury in 1968." The task that remains is to improve
upon the structure now contained in sections 56-58 of the Code.
Congress has before it the views of academicians and private practi-
tioners regarding steps that can be taken to strengthen the minimum tax.
Further, the Nixon Treasury has tended in the past to look with favor
on the minimum tax concept and thus here too, as in the case of tax
shelters, tax reform efforts may be able to win Treasury support or at
least avoid active Treasury opposition,'
Against this backdrop, the articles in this issue by Professors
Brannon, Taubman, and Klein make a valuable contribution to the
ongoing tax reform effort. Professor Brannon focuses our attention on
the vagaries of the legislative process, paying specific attention to the
investment credit and ADR, two principal tools in current tax shelter
operations. Professor Taubman's article on the investment credit pro-
vides needed analytical tools if Congress is to grapple with the general
role of the investment credit in the tax system and, more particularly,
its utilization in tax shelter transactions. The Ways and Means Com-
mittee has continued to be concerned about the proper tax treatment of
family units where both spouses work and of family units headed by
one working adult." Professor Klein's article here focuses attention on
82 I should note that I participated in Panel No. 6 (Feb. 20, 1973), supra note 27,
and presented testimony with respect to these two subjects. I may, therefore, he engaging
In wishful thinking by suggesting these areas as likely candidates for tax reform action.
The reader will have to balance for himself the arguments advanced in the text for this
proposition against the bias that may be present by virtue of my personal involvement
in the panel discussions on these subjects.
88 Tax Reform Studies, supra note 26, at 132.
84 The Treasury in 1969 proposed a minimum tax system known as the Limitation
on Tax Preferences (LTP), which was adopted by the House. H.R. Rep. No. 91-413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1969). However, the Treasury in 1970 favored enactment of
the very liberal carryover provision contained in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 56(c). This
provision materially weakened the impact of the minimum tax.
85 See Hearings on the Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where
Both Spouses are Working Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972).
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the central issues of this complex problem and points the discussion
in the right direction from the standpoint of tax reform.
This writer's contribution to this issue will consist of a develop-
ment of the theme suggested above. At the outset some aspects of tax
shelter operations and a range of possible responses to the problems
created by tax shelters will be considered. Second, suggestions for
strengthening the minimum tax will be offered. The goal of both dis-
cushions is to develop tax reform positions in these two areas where
reform appears feasible, positions that seem to be both responsive to
the problems and within the range of political acceptability. The pur-
pose of the following discussion is therefore not to develop the ideal tax
reform positions with respect to the range of problems created by tax
preferences in our income tax structure, but to explore limited but
potentially enactable responses to the problems presented by tax shel-
ters and tax preferences."
II. TAX REFORM AND TAX SHELTERS
Introduction
The problems created by tax shelter devices and the problems to
which the minimum tax is directed arise from two basic propositions:
(1) Congress desires, as a matter of national policy, to
provide federal financial assistance to selected industries or
economic activities; and
(2) Congress has determined that it will provide that fi-
nancial assistance through the federal income tax system in
the form of special tax provisions—credits, deductions, ex-
emptions, deferral of tax liability, or preferential rates—which
function as "tax expenditures."
Generally, few would quarrel with the desirability of most of the
goals sought to be obtained through, the federal financial assistance—
low income housing, adequate energy resources for a technological
society, abatement of industrial pollution, modernization of plant ma-
chinery and equipment, rehabilitation of low income housing, develop-
ment and conservation of our agricultural resources, and the like. While
many question whether the tax system is the best means for rendering
that financial assistance," the analysis in this section accepts arguendo
86 The material in sections II and III is based on the writer's statement submitted
to the House Ways and Means Committee during the Hearings on Tax Reform Topics
(Panel No. 6: Minimum Tax and Tax Shelter Devices, Feb. 20, 1973, supra note 27).
87 See, e.g., Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
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that the congressional decision to employ tax expenditures in selected
areas will continue.
Increasingly, however, we have become aware that the decision to
employ the federal income tax system as the vehicle for delivering
federal financial aid creates problems. One problem is that every time
Congress enacts a tax preference for a particular industry or economic
activity, a highly skilled band of tax and financial advisors with a
battery of computers is ready and able to convert that provision into
a tax shelter for their high-bracket clients. Tax expenditures for indus-
try and tax shelters for high-bracket taxpayers are thus opposite sides
of the same coin.
A second problem is to determine whether the marketing of these
tax benefits through the syndication of tax shelters channels federal tax
funds to those actually engaged in the activities to be aided, or whether
the federal aid is in fact siphoned off by persons who are really uncon-
nected with the activity. If the latter is the case, then attention should
be focused on developing responses to reduce or eliminate the trafficking
by high-bracket individuals and corporations in tax provisions that
were intended to benefit a particular industry or activity.
These two major problems created by tax shelter devices may be
approached in one or more of three ways:
(1) Place direct limits on one or more of the elements
essential to a tax shelter. The various recapture rules, for ex-
ample, deal with the capital gain aspect of tax shelters.
(2) Identify and correct those elements in the tax system
that permit the tax benefits to be utilized, e.g., through the
syndication mechanism, by persons outside the industry or
activity to be aided. One limited and incomplete example of
this approach is the provision in the Revenue Act of 1971
denying the investment credit to individual investor-lessors."
(3) Place overall limits on the extent to which individ-
uals or corporations can utilize tax preferences. This is the
approach of the minimum tax enacted in 1969."
In the following discussion in this section several types of tax
shelter arrangements will be examined with special reference to the
tax rules that facilitate syndication of the tax shelter. Next, suggested
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970);
McDaniel, Alternatives to Utilization of the Federal Tax System to Meet Social Problems,
11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 867 (1970).
88 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 46(d)(3).
89 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 66 56-58.
822
TAX REFORM, TAX SHELTERS AND TAX PREFERENCES
solutions to the tax shelter problem, representing approaches (1) and
(2) outlined above, will be offered. In section III, we will examine steps
that should be taken to strengthen and improve the minimum tax.
A. The Syndicated Real Estate Tax Shelter
1. The Elements of the Tax Shelter
There are four basic components of the tax sheltered investment
in real estate:"
(1) The shelter of income other than that derived from
rentals from the real estate—such as dividends, interest, exec-
utive compensation and the like—as the result of the excess
deductions generated by accelerated depreciation and interest.
(2) The deferral of tax resulting from accelerated depre-
ciation, in effect an interest-free loan from the government.
(3) The use of leverage which enables the investor to ob-
tain deductions at a faster rate than that at which he makes
his equity investment in the property" and in excess of his
actual investment.
(4) The availability of capital gain treatment upon ulti-
mate sale of the property, which is, in effect, a requirement
that the taxpayer repay only a part of the loan previously
made by the government through the deferral mechanism.
2. The Syndication of the Tax Shelter
The net result of combining the four factors is the delivery of a
very substantial dollar benefit to the person who can take advantage
of the tax shelter. Presumably, in the case of residential real estate,
the tax benefits were intended to provide federal financial assistance
to those engaged in the business of developing housing. The actual de-
veloper may not, however, be able to utilize fully tax benefits provided
for real estate. Further, those benefits are realized over a period of time,
while the developer usually desires immediate compensation for his
services in providing the housing. The answer to the developer's prob-
lem is to make a current sale of these future tax benefits to high-bracket
individuals—doctors, dentists, lawyers, corporate executives. Since it is
unlikely that any one of these investors could utilize the tax benefits
in full, the developer employs underwriters, salesmen, lawyers and ac-
40 See the Statements of Jerome Kurtz and Adrian DeWind, in Panel No. 4 (Feb. 8,
1973), supra note 27, for expanded discussions of the real estate tax shelter.
41 This point may be illustrated by reference to Exhibits A and B in Appendix A
infra. At the end of year 6 the project has generated depreciation deductions of over
$2.5 million. Yet the investors have an equity of only $1.55 million at this same point.
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countants to syndicate the tax benefits and thus sell them to a large
number of investors, each investor acquiring his allocable share of the
tax benefits.
The syndication of the real estate tax shelter is made possible by
a long-standing regulation42
 applying to limited partnerships the rule,
developed in the context of individual taxation, that a taxpayer is
entitled to include in his cost basis for depreciation purposes the amount
of a nonrecourse mortgage. Application of this rule in the limited part-
nership context means that the syndicator is able to divide up and sell
very large tax benefits for a very small equity investment.
This country has a commitment to provide housing for its people,
especially low- and middle-income housing. Therefore the question is
whether the syndication of the tax benefits available for residential real
estate assists in achieving this goal. To help answer this question, refer-
ence may be made to the sample housing project presented in Appendix
A." In that example, an apartment unit costing approximately $9 mil-
lion to build was financed by an $8.9 million FHA mortgage and $1.4
million from the sale of interests in the limited partnership. Thus, while
the FHA mortgage paid for over 98% of the cost of constructing the
building itself, those federal funds did not provide any compensation
for the developer who put the project together and oversaw its con-
struction. In order to obtain current compensation, it was necessary
for the developer to sell to the investor group the tax losses that would
be generated by the project. These investors were themselves looking
for a profit from the transaction and, as a result, they paid the devel-
oper less than the present value of the tax losses that would be borne
by the Treasury.
In effect, then, at the inception of the real estate project, the
Treasury as well as HUD was making a financial commitment to the
project. The Treasury promised to forego taxes over twenty years and
then require that only a part of such taxes be repaid. That Treasury
commitment was a benefit that businessmen could quantify in terms
of its present value. And this is what businessmen do in the tax shelter
syndication process—reduce the projected tax benefits to a present
value and then sell those benefits for as much of that value as can be
obtained.
But if businessmen can quantify the projected Treasury tax losses
in terms of a present value, the Treasury can and should do the same
and then determine where and for what its contribution to the project
42 Treas. Reg. 4 1.752-1(e).
48 The sample in Appendix A infra is excerpted from 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P.
McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation 425-40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fed-
eral Income Taxation].
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is going. Then an evaluation can be made of the contribution, if any,
that the syndication of the tax shelter makes to the construction of
the housing project.
3. Evaluation of the Syndicated Real Estate Tax Shelter"
For the project shown in Appendix A, the present discounted value
of the tax losses that the Treasury could expect to realize over the life
of the project can be arrived at by assuming a Treasury borrowing
rate of 6%, an average 60% marginal tax rate for the investor group,"
and capital gain treatment upon sale of the project—at a sale price of
$1 plus the balance of the mortgage—after twenty years. (In fact, of
course, if one or more of the investors dies during the twenty-year
period the Treasury loss will be increased because the gain at death
goes untaxed)" The Treasury tax losses in the example thus consist
of 60% of the tax-free cash and tax "losses" generated by the project.
Using a 6% discount rate, these benefits can be reduced to the present
value of the cumulative revenue loss to the Treasury. The Treasury
will collect some taxes in the final two years, and the present value of
these prospective tax collections may be similarly determined. Accord-
ing to this computation method the present value of the Treasury
revenue loss in the Appendix A example is over $2 million.
It was this $2 million Treasury commitment that was syndicated
through the tax shelter limited partnership. Where did the $2 million
go? As noted above, the investor group wanted a profit from the trans-
action and, in the sample project, it paid $1.4 million for the tax
benefits. Thus $600,000 of the Treasury's $2 million check stayed with
the investor group—a group that had nothing to do with the construc-
tion of the housing project. The developer received $1.4 million, but
he did not get to keep all of this sum as his compensation. Approxi-
mately 15% of this amount had to be paid to those who marketed the
tax benefits—the underwriter, salesmen, lawyers, accountants. Thus
some $210,000 went to persons whose presence in the transaction re-
sulted solely from the syndication process, not from the construction
process.
The net result was that the developer finally received a fee of
under $1.2 million—a little more than 10% of the project cost—for his
services. Presumably the developer is the one for whom the federal tax
44 I am greatly indebted to Mr. Fred R. Becker, a member of the Massachusetts Bar,
for sharing with me his insights and efforts in developing the following analysis.
45 Prospectuses and sales materials for syndicated tax shelter operations routinely
recommend that investors be in tax brackets in excess of 50%.
40 int. Rev. Code of 1954, 4 1014.
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benefits were intended. But note that in order to get the developer a
fee of $1.2 million, the Treasury spent $2 million! The Treasury paid
doctors, dentists, lawyers and investment bankers $600,000 to act as
conduits for delivering a fee to the developer—a true negative income
tax for the wealthy.° From the standpoint of federal spending, it is
obvious that the federal government could have obtained precisely the
same housing by simply paying the developer the $1.2 million fee that
he was prepared to build the project for. The other $800,000 of federal
money was wasted.
This result is not the inevitable consequence of using the tax
system to aid housing. The process of reducing the tax benefits to a
present value is just another way of determining a federal tax credit.
Granting a tax credit to the developer in an amount designed to provide
him with the requisite compensation (say 10% of the estimated con-
struction costs) would eliminate the waste in the tax shelter syndication
process. To the extent that the tax credit exceeded the developer's tax
liability, a positive tax refund could be generated. In this manner the
federal tax benefit would be confined to the one person who has con-
tributed something to the creation of housing—the goal of the tax pref-
erence. Substantial tax reform and substantial savings to taxpayers can
thus be achieved even if Congress elects to continue to provide federal
financial aid to residential real estate through the tax system. This
approach is further discussed below."
B. The Oil and Gas Tax Shelter
1. The Elements of the Tax Shelter
Present tax rules provide the necessary elements for the oil and gas
tax shelter. The element of deferral is provided by the right granted
under section 263 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code to expense imme-
diately intangible drilling and development costs incurred in connection
with the drilling of the oil and gas well. Under ordinary tax accounting
rules, these intangible drilling and development costs should be cap-
italized and recovered over the productive life of the well. The element
of shelter of non-oil income results from the fact that ordinarily pro-
duction will not take place in the year in which the intangible drilling
47 A negative income tax generally results in a shelter transaction when current
deductions can be used to offset ordinary income, followed by sale at capital gain rates.
See Halperin, Capital Gains and Ordinary Deductions: Negative Income Tax for the
Wealthy, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 387 (1971). The text example quantifies the
amount of the negative income tax to the investors in the sample transaction.
48 See text following note 77 infra.
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and development expenses are incurred; hence these deductions are
offset against income other than that to be derived from the well. The
capital gain element is involved because upon sale of the property there
is no recapture of the previously deducted intangible costs. Leverage
is available in the form of nonrecourse loans for the bulk of the in-
tangible costs. An additional tax benefit is then provided in the form
of percentage depletion," which may have the effect of converting into
an exemption the deferral obtained through the deduction of intangible
drilling and development costs.
The following example illustrates the operation of the oil and gas
tax shelter." Assume that a driller expends $1 million in the first year
to drill a well. His intangible drilling and development expenses com-
prise 90% of this amount. Therefore he secures a $900,000 deduction
in the year in which the well is drilled. For an individual in the 70%
tax bracket, this produces a tax savings of $630,000 in year 1, and the
driller has remaining a net after-tax investment in the well of $370,000.
Assume that the well is successful and in year 2 generates $150,000 of
gross income and $100,000 of net income. The percentage depletion
allowance in year 2 will be $33,000 (22% of $150,000), taxable income
will be $67,000 ($100,000 minus $33,000), and the driller will incur a
tax liability of $46,900 (70% of $67,000). The driller will, however,
have received in the second year $53,100 in cash (consisting of $20,100
in after-tax income and $33,000 in tax-free income from the percentage
depletion allowance). In the third year the driller sells the property for
$900,000. Assuming that the cost basis is $100,000, the driller will have
capital gain of $800,000 on which he will pay $280,000 in tax (35%
of $800,000), leaving net receipts from the sale of $620,000.
What are the combined results of this transaction? The driller will
have received $673,100 of after-tax cash from income and the sale of
the property, from which he subtracts his after-tax investment of
$370,000, leaving a net after -tax cash profit of $303,100. In fact, of
course, the profit is even greater because the above computations do
not take into account the factor of timing; i.e., the benefits of the de-
duction are available in year 1, but the taxes incurred are not paid
until years 2 and 3
The following table illustrates the above transaction in simplified
form:
99 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, 4 613.
o The example in the text is based on one developed in Rossbach, To Buy or Not
to Buy—A Trust Officer's View of Tax-Shelter Oil and Gas Drilling Programs, 110 Trusts
and Estates 906 (1971), reprinted in Federal Income Taxation, supra note 43, at 469-73.
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Year 1:






Net Income	 Percentage	 Taxable	 Tax	 Net Cash
Depletion	 Income
$ 100,000	 $ 33,000
	 $ 67,000




Year 2 Income and	 After-Tax	 After-Tax
Sale Proceeds	 Investment	 Profit
$ 673,100	 $370,000	 $303,100
A major advantage of the oil tax shelter over the real estate tax
shelter is the existence of the percentage depletion allowance. Absent
percentage depletion, the intangible drilling and expense deduction
would operate like accelerated depreciation—in effect as an interest free
loan in year 1, which would be repaid over the productive life of the
well. But percentage depletion changes this result. The percentage
depletion allowance is unrelated to basis and therefore reduces the
driller's income from the well each year even though basis has long
since been exhausted. In effect, then, the existence of percentage deple-
tion insures that the driller will never have to repay the taxes saved
by deduction of the intangible expenses if he holds the well for its
productive life. The "loan" is thus converted to an outright grant.
If the driller sells prior to the exhaustion of the well, capital gain
treatment insures that only a part of the taxes saved by the intangibles
deduction will have to be repaid.
2. Leveraging the Tax Shelter
In the above example, we have assumed that the driller put in the
full $1 million from his own funds. But under current tax laws this is
not necessary in order to obtain the three tax benefits: deduction in full
of intangible drilling and development expenses, percentage depletion,
and capital gains. Suppose that the driller had been able to borrow
$700,000 out of the $1 million necessary to drill the well. In such a case,
he would in effect, have been able to secure $900,000 in deductions by
putting up $300,000 of his own money. This advantage is heightened
if the driller has been able to borrow on a nonrecourse basis, i.e., the
lender looks only to the well for security and not to the personal liability
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of the individual driller. Current tax rules permit the driller to deduct
in full the intangible drilling and development costs even though he
personally has no liability to repay the loan that generated the funds
to make the expenditures for intangible drilling and development costs.
3. Syndication of the Tax Shelter
From the standpoint of the driller, the major problem in the above
situation is that he cannot get the full benefits of the three elements of
the tax shelter in the year he drills; he must wait for three years in
order to realize fully the tax benefits made available to him in the above
example. Accordingly the driller then seeks a mechanism whereby he
can transfer these tax benefits to other high-bracket individuals who
can fully utilize the deduction for intangible drilling and development
costs in the first year and who will pay cash to the developer for the
package of tax benefits. The tax shelter limited partnership provides
that mechanism.
There are many variations on the form that the tax shelter limited
partnership may take in connection with oil and gas transactions.
Essentially, however, the process follows that described above with
respect to the syndicated real estate tax shelter. 61 A limited partnership
is formed and interests therein sold to investors. The limited partner-
ship agreement will call for a fee to be paid to the driller for his services
in connection with drilling the well, the fee to be derived from the
syndication proceeds. From the driller's standpoint, therefore, he has
secured his fee for drilling the well in the form of immediate cash. This
cash consists of the present value of the tax benefits derived from the
intangible drilling and development expense deduction, percentage de-
pletion, and ultimate sale at capital gain rates.
From the standpoint of the investors, of course, the limited part-
nership investment is very attractive. By putting up $300,000 they
secure $900,000 in immediate deductions against other income. If they
are all in the 70% bracket, this means that they have received a
$630,000 tax benefit from the federal government which, assuming
production, they can either retain entirely by holding onto the asset or
repay to the extent of only one-half if they sell the property. Even as
to the amount repayable, they will have the interest-free use of those
funds until such time as the sale is made.
4. Relationship of the Syndication Process to the Objective of the Tax
Benefit
Presumably the objective of the tax provision that allows imme-
diate deduction of intangibles with no requirement that those intangibles
51 See Statement of Milton A. Dauber, in Panel No. 6 (Feb. 20, 1973), supra note 27.
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be recaptured upon sale of the property is to encourage exploration and
drilling for new oil reserves Thus, some persons viewing the above
syndication process conclude that there is nothing inherently wrong
with the syndication of the tax benefits since, after all, another oil well
has been drilled. But upon closer analysis of the transaction, it will be
found that a considerable portion of the federal contribution to the
drilling of the oil well does not go to drilling at all. It is siphoned off
by the syndication process itself, as was true in the case of the real
estate syndications. Only a part is used for the actual cost of drilling
for oil.
The point can be illustrated by the following example. Assume that
a driller obtains a $100,000 nonrecourse loan, which amount is sufficient
to enable the driller to pay the costs of actual drilling, but not pay the
driller any fee for his efforts. He syndicates the tax benefits from the
project for $100,000, of which $15,000 goes to pay for the costs of
syndication, and $85,000 for the driller's fee. Assuming 70% marginal
tax brackets for the investor group, the Treasury check on this trans-
action totals $129,500 (70% X $185,000). (This computation assumes
that the full drilling fee of $85,000 can qualify for the intangibles de-
duction.) It is apparent that in this transaction a commercial lender was
willing to give the driller a $100,000 loan for the cost of drilling the
well. The driller has indicated by his actions that he is willing to do
this for an $85,000 fee. He obtains this fee by selling some of the
tax benefits. Where has the other $44,500 of the Treasury check gone?
Part of it, $15,000, went to those in the syndication process—a group
whose presence in the transaction was totally unnecessary to the actual
drilling. The other $29,500 stayed with the investor group—in effect it
constituted a commission paid by the federal government for delivering
the driller's check. Thus one-third of the Treasury check was wasted,
going to persons whose presence produced no more drilling and no more
oil than would have been the case had the Treasury paid the driller his
$85,000 fee directly.
The obvious question is why, if the federal government wishes to
provide assistance to drillers to explore and develop for new reserves,
it does not simply confine its financial assistance to the driller as such,
thereby reducing the total revenue cost of obtaining the well. Even if it
is deemed desirable to provide this assistance through the tax system,
it may be provided more efficiently by, for example, giving a tax credit
to the driller in an amount equal to a given percentage of the drilling
costs!'
52 See teat following note 78 infra.
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C. Equipment Leasing Tax Shelters
1. The Tax Benefits
A number of significant tax benefits are provided as a means of
assisting industry to modernize plant equipment and machinery or to
acquire special purpose equipment. Thus the investment credit and
accelerated depreciation (including ADR) are available generally for
capital investment in qualified property. In addition, special five-year
amortization provisions have been introduced to help reduce the cost
of installing pollution abatement or control facilities," acquiring rail-
road rolling stock," installing mine safety equipment," rehabilitating
low-income housing, 5° installing on-the-job training and child care
facilities," and, under a highly questionable ruling issued by the In-
ternal Revenue Service, developing computer software."
But these tax benefits are not equally available or valuable to all
companies. Accelerated depreciation and the investment credit, for ex-
ample, are of no benefit to a loss corporation. Even a profit corporation
may find it difficult or undesirable to utilize the tax benefits directly
because, for example, it is unable to borrow the requisite capital for
the investment, must pay prohibitively high interest rates, or desires to
keep such an additional liability off its balance sheet. In such situations,
the corporation will look to a leasing arrangement as a means of fi-
nancing the capital improvements.
Because of the tax benefits of accelerated depreciation, the interest
deduction, and, in some cases, the investment credit, the business can
find high-bracket investors who can take advantage of the tax benefits
and will therefore be willing to finance the acquisition at a relatively
low cost to the business. The leasing arrangement is the financing mech-
anism utilized and provides the vehicle for insuring that the individual
investors obtain the tax benefits. The business benefits by being freed
from the need for making a capital outlay, and it obtains favorable
rental terms because the tax benefits intended for business are being
made available to the investor-lessors. In the case of accelerated depre-
ciation, the benefits to the investor of tax deferral are enhanced by
highly leveraging the transaction.
The Revenue Act of 1971 imposed restrictions on the use of the
investment credit by individual lessors in leasing transactions. There-
55 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, I} 169.
54 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 184.
55 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 187.
55 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 167(k).
57 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 188.
55 Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 303.
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fore, depending on the particular tax benefit to be utilized, one of two
different forms of equipment leasing transactions are generally used:
(1) Individual lessors acting through a limited partner-
ship are involved where one of the five-year rapid amortization
provisions is utilized.
(2) A corporate lessor, normally a bank or a subsidiary
thereof, is involved where the investment credit plus ADR
provides the tax assistance.
The first of these techniques involves the syndication of the tax shelter;
the second involves the use of the tax shelter by the financing institu-
tion itself. It is therefore useful to treat each type of transaction
separately.
2. Individual Lessors—The Syndicated Equipment Leasing Tax
Shelter
Syndicators of equipment leasing tax shelters using one of the
five-year rapid amortization provisions are selling just one thing: tax
deferral. The investor obtains a loan in the first five years which he
repays through higher taxes (as the result of no depreciation deduc-
tions) over the remaining useful life of the property. Standing alone,
then, the federal government seems merely to be postponing the collec-
tion of its taxes, and the Treasury has lately taken to assuring Con-
gress that accelerated depreciation is "only deferral" of tax liability."
But the syndicators of tax shelters know that this "only deferral"
is a very valuable commodity in the marketplace and can command a
high price if properly packaged. The principal elements of the "deferral
package" are
(1) Seventy to one hundred percent nonrecourse financ-
ing of the property;
(2) The use of a limited partnership with the corre-
sponding tax result that the investor-limited partners include
the full amount of the mortgage in their tax basis;
(3) Use of a five-year rapid amortization provision to
deduct against the basis and thus to accrue tax deferral for
the investor.
It is helpful to analyze a sample tax shelter syndication for a
railroad locomotive that used the five-year amortization provisions of
59 Statements by the President and by Secretary David M. Kennedy on Asset Depre-
ciation Range, Jan. 11, 1971, 7 CCH 1971 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 6366. The Treasury,
when it is free to be more objective, knows better; see Treasury Dept Study on Tax
Depreciation Policy (1970), reprinted in 116 Cong. Rec. E6963-75 (daily ed. July 23,
1970).
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section 184. In this transaction," a limited partnership acquired a loco-
motive to lease to a railroad. The investor-limited partners contributed
$1,614,000, and the balance of the cost, $4,015,000, was obtained
through a nonrecourse mortgage. The locomotive was leased to a rail-
road under a fifteen-year net lease at a rental sufficient to pay the inter-
est, amortize the mortgage over the term of the lease, pay certain
administrative costs, and make small cash distributions to the partners.
In this transaction the following characteristics of the tax shelter
noted above are present:
(1) In return for putting up $1,614,000 the investors ob-
tained a $5,629,000 locomotive; i.e., the transaction was over
70% financed, with no personal liability for the $4,015,000
loan on the part of the investors.
(2) Despite the fact that they actually invested less than
30% of the cost of the locomotive, the investors were entitled
to deduct the entire cost over a five-year period.
(3) The five-year rapid amortization produced a "tax
loss" for the first five years which the investors used not only
to eliminate tax on the rentals paid by the railroad, but also to
offset other income; thus the investors obtained a deferral of
tax on these amounts.
(4) The federal loan in the amount of the investors' tax
savings will be repaid over years 6 to 15, without interest.
The schedules in Appendix B summarize the anticipated results
for the investors. In the example an individual investor has put up
$50,000, and yet the schedules prepared by the syndicators show that
after fifteen years the investor will have only $44,002 in cash plus tax
benefits; see Schedule A of Appendix B. Why would any investor de-
liberately enter into a losing proposition? The answer is that this purely
cash analysis does not tell the whole story. Schedule B in Appendix B
indicates that if the investor doubled up on tax preferences and invested
his tax benefits in 5% tax-exempt municipal bonds, he would end up
with $85,390 net profit after taxes plus his original $50,000 investment.
This is to be compared to only $58,005 that he would have earned had
he originally invested in 5% tax-exempt bonds.
In short, the syndicator of the equipment leasing tax shelter says
to the investor: "If you put your $50,000 in 5% tax-exempt bonds, you
will end up with only $58,005 profit after fifteen years. But if you give
me the $50,000 and then invest your tax benefits in tax-exempt bonds,
you will end up with an $85,390 profit after 15 years." This result flows
from the fact that the investor is able to take accelerated depreciation
co The example is from Federal Income Taxation, supra note 43, at 445-50.
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not only on his equity, but also on the amount of the nonrecourse loan
obtained by the partnership—an amount for which the investor is never
personally liable.
The example given above illustrates the use of the syndicated
tax shelter involving five-year amortization for railroad rolling stock.
The same type of transaction can, of course, be structured for the five-
year write-off provisions for pollution control facilities, mine safety
equipment, and computer software. From a federal spending standpoint,
the question regarding these syndicated tax shelter transactions is
whether the syndication of the tax benefits has in any way aided the
federal program of assistance for which the tax benefits were intended.
As was the case with the tax shelters discussed above, the answer is
clear: part of the federal expenditures goes simply to paying the cost
of the syndication process—a process that produces, for example, no
railroad locomotives. However, it is only the structure of the tax pro-
visions that makes this process necessary. If the railroad or other in-
tended beneficiary could obtain the federal tax benefits directly and
immediately—instead of over time—the syndicate could be eliminated
and federal funds be saved. Even if Congress wishes to use the tax
system to deliver financial assistance, it can do so without involving the
investor syndicate at all.'
3. Individual Lessors—The Syndicated Pollution Control Equipment
Leasing Tax Shelter with Tax-Exempt Financing
Section 169 of the Code provides five-year rapid amortization for
the cost of certified pollution control equipment. Thus the tax benefits
resulting from this provision—intended to provide federal cost-sharing
for industries investing in certain types of pollution abatement or con-
trol equipment—can be syndicated and marketed on the same basis as
the equipment lease transaction described above. But in the case of
pollution control equipment, still another tax benefit can be added. In
the example of equipment leasing given above, the leveraging was
obtained through a commercial lending institution, which charged
customary interest rates. Suppose that the leverage could instead be
supplied by tax-exempt financing. Then the benefits of lower interest
charges resulting from the tax exemption could be added onto the other
tax shelter benefits.
Present tax rules permit this to be done. Section 103 (c) (4) (F)
contains an exemption from the industrial development bond rules for
bonds issued for qualified pollution control facilities. Thus a local gov-
ernment unit can agree to issue industrial development bonds for a
pollution control facility for, say, 80% of the total cost of the facility.
el See teat at notes 74-77 Infra.
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The investor group, through a limited partnership, puts up the balance
of the funds (perhaps borrowed on a nonrecourse basis) The city
"leases" the facility to the investor group for a rental sufficient to amor-
tize the tax-exempt bonds and pay interest thereon The investor group
in turn leases the facility to a manufacturing company. The investor
group gets not only the tax benefits from the five-year write-off but also
additional profit from the fact that its interest costs are lower than
would be the case in ordinary financing.'
4. Corporate Lessors—The Equipment Leasing Tax Shelter
When Congress reinstated the investment credit in 1971, it pro-
vided that the investment credit was in general not to be available to
individual investor-lessors." Concern was expressed over "the extent to
which individuals (singly or as a group in a joint venture) are able to
utilize the tax benefits of leasing transactions . . . as a means to shelter
from tax a substantial part of their other income!" 04 Similar restrictions
were not placed on the availability of the credit to corporate lessors,
however. Thus there continues to be widespread use of the benefits of
the investment credit in tax shelter transactions—only now the income
being sheltered is that of banking or other financial institutions instead
of high-bracket individuals.
In addition to reinstating the investment credit in 1971, Congress
also approved an additional form of accelerated depreciation by au-
thorizing the adoption of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system
of depreciation." Under ADR, a taxpayer is entitled to shorten guideline
lives for equipment by as much as 20%. Any of the authorized forms
of accelerated depreciation can then be utilized with respect to the
property. Thus the combination of the investment credit plus acceler-
ated depreciation under ADR provides a great potential for tax shelter
devices. In situations where the taxpayer has the choice of utilizing one
of the five-year rapid amortization provisions (for example, for invest-
ment in railroad rolling stock), the availability of the investment credit
plus ADR must also be considered. Utilization of the investment credit
plus accelerated depreciation under the ADR system will often produce
a greater tax benefit than is produced by a five-year write-off of the
same costs. For example, it is possible that the investment credit plus
the sum-of-the-year digits method of accelerated depreciation, using
ADR lives, will produce a greater tax benefit even for equipment that
has a useful life of up to fourteen years than will a five-year amortiza-
62 See Lynch, The Developing Role of Leveraged Tax-Shelter Leasing in Pollution
Control Financing, Investment Dealers' Digest (Sept. 12, 1972).
63 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(d) (3).
04 5. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1971).
05 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(m).
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tion of the costs of that same equipment."' Thus it is obvious that many
companies that seek to use a leasing transaction will prefer one in which
the lessor is able to utilize the investment credit plus ADR, since lower
rentals should be generated for the lessee as the result of the greater
tax benefits flowing to the lessor.
Increasingly banks have moved into this leasing business for two
reasons: (1) the leasing transactions are essentially financing trans-
actions wherein banks normally operate; (2) since only a corporate
lessor can take advantage of the investment credit, banks have con-
ducted the leasing operations directly instead of providing nonrecourse
financing to limited partnerships for leasing transactions utilizing one
of the five-year rapid amortization devices.
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the investment credit
can be utilized by a bank against its total income tax liability, regard-
less of the fact that the property qualifying for the investment credit
was utilized solely in a loss operation by the bank." Thus a bank
entering into a leasing transaction can take advantage both of the tax
"losses" generated by ADR and the investment credit to offset its
profits and taxes from its regular banking operations. The transaction
can be effected either through a leasing division of the bank or through
a leasing subsidiary, with the bank and the subsidiary filing consoli-
dated returns."
While Congress was properly concerned in 1971 with the utiliza-
tion of the investment credit in syndicated tax shelter devices benefiting
high-bracket individual taxpayers, it is not clear why banks and other
financial institutions should be permitted to shelter banking income as
the result of the leasing transactions. The tax shelter is operating for
banks in exactly the same manner as for individual taxpayers, even
though in 1971 Congress decided that individuals should not be able
to use the investment credit in tax shelter transactions." In sum, the
congressional action in denying the credit to individual lessors in the
1971 Act was appropriate; however, that prohibition should be ex-
ell See Worthy, Pollution Facilities Continue to Provide Substantial Tax Benefits,
37 J. Tax. 2 (1972).
or Rev. Rul. 71-386, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 59.
88 For discussions of the equipment leasing tax shelter for banks, see, e.g., Brown,
Return on Investment and Book Accounting for Leveraged Lease Investments, 54 J. Com .
Bank Lending 24 (Aug. 1972); Prochnow, Bank Leasing: A Lawyer's View, 86 Banking
L.J. 305 (1969).
09
 Permitting commercial banks to employ the equipment leasing tax shelter may go
far to reverse the effects of the reforms enacted in 1969 which were intended to increase
the low effective rates paid by banks as a result of artificially high bad debt deductions.
See H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Seas., pt. I, at 120-24 (1969). The tax sheltered
equipment leasing transaction simply substitutes different artificial tax rules by which
the effective rates of taxation on commercial banks are reduced.
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tended to corporate lessors as well. And in both cases, attention must
be given to the role of accelerated depreciation in the shelter operations.
As with the other tax shelter arrangements considered in this sec-
tion, the question arises whether the financial assistance that Congress
desires to give through tax benefits can be given more efficiently: here,
specifically, whether the aid intended for industry for modernization
of plant equipment and machinery can be made available via the tax
system to corporate users who for non-tax reasons desire to lease rather
than purchase the equipment. It appears that such a system can be
devised, and it is discussed below."
•
D. Possible Legislative Responses to the Tax Shelter Problem
Congress could choose among at least three approaches for dealing
with the problems created by the existence of tax shelters and the
syndication thereof. The first approach would place direct limitations
on one or more elements of the tax shelter:
(a) The tax shelter aspect can be limited by providing
that the tax benefits attributable to a particular activity can be
deducted only from income generated by that activity. Thus,
for example, depreciation with respect to a leased railroad
locomotive could be deducted only against the rental income
derived under the lease of the locomotive."
(b) The advantages of tax deferral can be limited by
treating the deferral as a loan and requiring the repayment
thereof with interest."
(c) The advantage of leverage can be limited by provid-
ing that a taxpayer can deduct depreciation only to the extent
of his actual investment in the property."
(d) The advantage of capital gain can be limited by pro-
viding for full recapture of depreciation in the case of real
estate and intangibles in the case of oil and gas."
Under a second approach, Congress could deal with the syndication
72 See text following note 77 infra.
71 This was the approach adopted with respect to the farm "loss" tax shelter by the
1968 Treasury Tax Reform Studies. See U.S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform Studies
and Proposals 152-63 (House Ways and Means Comm. and Senate Finance Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st Sess.) (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Studies].
72 This approach was adopted in 1969 by the Senate Finance Committee with respect
to the deferral of tax obtained by beneficiaries of accumulation trusts. S. Rep. No. 91-552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 129-30 (1969).
73 This is the approach proposed in S. 1439, 93d Cong., 1st Sess (1973). See 119
Cong. Rec. 51050 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
74 Id.
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aspects of the tax shelter quite apart from addressing itself to the ques-
tion of the tax shelter itself. The possible solution would be to repeal
the present Treasury regulations with respect to limited partnerships
and provide that limited partners would be entitled to deductions only
to the extent of their actual equity in the limited partnership." Thus
nonrecourse loans would not be added to the basis of the limited part-
ners, and under partnership tax rules their share of partnership deduc-
lions would be correspondingly limited to their actual investment. This
rule would correspond in principle with the rules applicable to share-
holders in Subchapter S corporations."
The treatment of limited partners in substantially the same manner
as shareholders in Subchapter S corporations appears entirely appro-
priate as a conceptual matter While arguably it may be proper to allow
an individual who has unlimited liability with respect to a real estate
project, for example, to include the amount of a mortgage in his cost
basis for depreciation purposes, it is entirely inappropriate to treat
limited partners as if they were individuals with potentially unlimited
liability. They do not have unlimited liability with respect to the proj-
ect; for example, they are totally insulated from tort liability in the
same manner as are shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation. There-
fore, if investors seek to obtain the advantages of limited liability which
a limited partnership affords, it would appear that they should be
treated by tax law the same as other investors who seek limited liability
through stock ownership in a corporation.
However, the results of the 1971 Act's limitation of the investment
credit to corporate lessors should give Congress pause before it employs
this second approach. Adoption of this more limited response to the
tax shelter problem would leave tax shelters intact for individuals will-
ing to accept total liability and for corporations. Its major drawback
is that it would probably shift the bulk of present tax-sheltered trans-
actions to banks and other financial institutions." A predictable result
of such a shift is that banks would succeed in maintaining low, effective
rates of taxation despite the reforms enacted in 1969 with respect to
taxation of financial institutions.
A third approach would eliminate tax expenditures for taxpayers
other than those for whom the tax benefits were intended, yet continue
to provide federal financial benefits through the tax system to the
industries to be assisted. Thus, for example, it would be possible to
15 This is the approach proposed in H.R. 1040, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See 119
Cong. Rec. H44 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1973) (remarks of Mr. Corman).
76 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, 1374.
77 Regulation Y, fl 225.4 of the Bank Holding Company Act treats investment in
low-income housing as a financing transaction in which banks can properly invest. 12
C.F.R. 225.4 (1973).
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extend the investment credit concept of the Revenue Act of 1971 by
providing that the credit be available only with respect to the user of
the qualified property. Where the user would be in a negative tax
liability situation as a result of the credit, a positive tax refund could
be generated for the taxpayer. Where the taxpayer for non-tax reasons
leased the property, the rents would reflect full rental value, but the
investment credit would be available to the user in the form of a subsidy
for the rental payments. Thus the advantages of the investment credit
would be available whether the taxpayer owned the property outright
or whether he leased it and regardless of whether or not the taxpayer
was generating a positive tax liability. In the case of the investment
credit it would be necessary to correct the deficiency in present law by
providing that the amount of the credit itself be included in the gross
income of the taxpayer receiving the benefit thereof.
With respect to accelerated depreciation, a similar approach could
be adopted. The simplest solution would be to convert the various forms
of accelerated depreciation to an increased investment credit and re-
quire that it too be included in gross income." A somewhat more
complex solution would provide that the accelerated depreciation be
available only to the user of the property and that any unusable depre-
ciation generate a positive tax refund-loan from the Treasury, which
would, however, be repayable over the life of the property. This treat-
ment of course corresponds to the current provision of interest-free
loans by means of the depreciation deduction.
Of the three approaches, the second is perhaps the easiest for
Congress to adopt. Yet because it would have the effect of driving still
more tax sheltered transactions into the exclusive orbit of commercial
lending institutions, more is required than the mere application to
limited partnerships of Subchapter S rules regarding deduction of net
operating losses; additional action would be required to limit the extent
to which commercial banks could reduce tax liability as the result of
investment in tax-shelter transactions. In contrast, the first approach—
or some combination of the measures suggested therein—would obvi-
ously be the most effective in dealing with tax shelters. In addition,
fewer biases would be created in favor of corporate investors than under
the second approach. However, because some of these measures would
move beyond the syndication problem and involve direct changes in
present tax benefits, greater Treasury opposition may be expected.
The third approach is intriguing. It retains present tax expenditure
levels and it employs the tax system to deliver benefits, but it eliminates
utilization of tax benefits by persons or corporations not directly in-
78 It should be noted that the analysis in text following note 44 supra is in effect a
computation of the proposed credit in the case of real estate.
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volved in the activity Congress desires to aid. Further research appears
warranted to determine the feasibility of this approach to the tax shelter
problem, especially where corporations are the principal investors in
the tax shelters.
III. THE MINIMUM TAX
A. Background
The minimum tax for tax preferences" adopted in the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 represents still another approach to the tax equity problems
created by tax preferences, tax shelters, and the syndication thereof.
In effect, the approach of the minimum tax is based on the following
analytical progression:
(1) Congress does not wish to change the tax rules that
provide the basis for the tax shelters discussed above;
(2) Congress does not wish to prohibit entirely the syn-
dication of the tax shelters;
(3) Congress does wish, however, to place some overall
limits on the extent to which any individual can take advan-
tage of tax preferences, and therefore of tax shelters, either
individually or through the syndication device.
The minimum tax constitutes a limitation not only on the use of special
tax benefits but also on tax shelters and the syndication of those tax
shelters. While the minimum tax adopted in 1969 was based on a sound
principle—that individuals or corporations should not be able to com-
bine tax preferences in such a way as to escape totally their liability
for federal income taxation—the tax as adopted needs to be strength-
ened in order for it to perform its avowed purpose. As presently consti-
tuted, the minimum tax falls short of achieving its goal. This conclusion
is buttressed by the somewhat disappointing revenue yielded by the
minimum tax in 1970. 8° It is further evidenced by the fact that, while
prospectuses in syndicated tax shelter transactions routinely advise of
the possible applicability of the minimum tax, the tax has obviously
not slowed in any significant way the tax shelter syndication process.
In order to formulate the steps that need to be taken to strengthen
the minimum tax, it is helpful to review the context out of which the
present minimum tax arose. The 1968 U.S. Treasury Department Tax
79 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 56-58.
99 The yield from the minimum tax in 1970 was only $117 million from individuals as
compared to an expected $290 million. See Federal Income Taxation, supra note 43, at
1195. This result is not surprising if one applies the minimum tax as adopted to the cases
of high-income, low-taxpaying individuals set forth in the Tax Reform Studies, supra
note 71, at 92-94.
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Reform Studies and Proposals proposed a minimum tax as an alterna-
tive to the tax liability computed under regular rules." They required
that the taxpayer first compute his regular tax liability, utilizing in full
the tax preferences available to him. He then recomputed his tax liabil-
ity, this time including the specified items of tax preference in income,
and applied a rate schedule incorporating rates at one-half those appli-
cable to regular tax computations. If the resulting minimum tax was
higher than tax liability computed under regular rules, then the mini-
mum tax became the taxpayer's tax liability for the year. Thus the 1968
proposal was based on the assumption that the minimum tax should be
a progressive tax, conforming in its rate progression to that contained
in the rates specified in section 1 of the Code for individuals. It was also
a comparative tax, which determined the applicability of the minimum
tax by comparing that tax liability to the taxpayer's regular tax liability.
In April of 1969 the Nixon Administration proposed a minimum
tax which was in general based on the same assumptions, although the
mechanics differed. Under the Nixon proposal for a Limitation on Tax
Preferences (LTP), the taxpayer could not utilize tax preferences to
exclude more than one-half of his expanded income—his adjusted gross
income plus defined tax preferences. Thus if a taxpayer had $100,000
of adjusted gross income and $200,000 of tax preferences, he would be
entitled to utilize the tax preferences only to the extent of $150,000;
and the disqualified $50,000 of tax preferences would be includible in
the tax base and .taxed at normal rates. The House adopted the LTP
concept in its version of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.' 2 Like the mini-
mum tax proposed by the 1968 Treasury Studies, LTP was essentially
a comparative tax and a progressive tax.
In both the 1968 Treasury Proposals and the LTP approach, a
system of allocation of deductions was adopted as a necessary adjunct
to the minimum tax." The allocation of deductions provision applied to
the personal deductions of a taxpayer and required, in effect, that an
individual with itemized personal deductions allocate those deductions
between taxable and tax-exempt income, with the deductions being dis-
allowed to the extent allocable to the latter category. The theory of the
allocation of deductions approach was, of course, that a taxpayer could
pay personal expenditures either out of taxable or tax-exempt income.
It was reasonable to assume that he paid those expenses in the same
proportion that his taxable income bore to his total income.
81 Tax Reform Studies, supra note 71, at 132.
82
 For a comparison of the Nixon Administration Proposals and the House version,
see Hearings on Tax Reform, House Ways and Means Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. 14, at 5060 (1969), and H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, supra note 69, at 77.
83
 Tax Reform Studies, supra note 71, at 142; H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, supra note
69, at 80.
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In its consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Senate
Finance Committee abandoned the approach represented by the 1968
Treasury minimum tax proposal and LTP. Instead, it substituted a flat
5% (later changed to 10%) rate on preference income in excess of a
$30,000 exemption." The minimum tax adopted by the Senate Finance
Committee rested on completely different assumptions from those that
underlay LTP and the 1968 Treasury proposal. The minimum tax
adopted by the Senate Finance Committee was an additive tax, not a
comparative tax. That is to say, the minimum tax applied regardless of
the relationship which a taxpayer's preference income bore to his tax-
able income. Further, the tax was a proportional tax—aside from the
exemption—as opposed to a progressive tax. A Senate floor amendment,
ultimately adopted by the Conference Committee,85 engrafted back onto
the minimum tax adopted by the Senate Finance Committee a part of
the comparative approach of the LTP proposal. This was done by
permitting a deduction for minimum tax purposes of the amount of
regular tax liability incurred by the taxpayer. The result of the amend-
ment was an uneasy amalgam of the comparative and additive ap-
proaches to a minimum tax system that is causing substantial difficulty
with the minimum tax now in effect.
In addition, all three approaches to the concept of a minimum tax
omitted from the tax base significant items of tax preferences. In order
to make the minimum tax fully effective in dealing with the tax shelter
problem, the minimum tax must be expanded to include these omitted
items. Other steps must be taken both to improve the rate structure and
to make structural improvements in the minimum tax system itself. The
actions to be taken may be considered under the following categories:
(1) Expansion of the minimum tax base.
(2) Changing the rate structure to provide a progressive
rate system for individuals and a separate flat rate structure
for corporations.
(3) Reduction of the $30,000 exemption for individuals
and elimination of the exemption for corporations.
(4) Structural changes within the minimum tax.
(5) Adoption and strengthening of supportive provisions
for the minimum tax.
B. Expansion of the Minimum Tax Base
If the minimum tax is to fulfill its function of insuring that every
taxpayer in the United States makes some minimum contribution to
84 S. Rep. No. 91-552, gist Cong., 1st Sess. 111-18 (1969).
88 H.R. Rep. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 302 (1969).
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the Government, then the first requisite for the reform of the minimum
tax system is to expand the minimum tax base to include those items
that presently enable a wealthy individual to escape tax altogether, or
to reduce his tax liability below an acceptable minimum. There are a
number of tax preferences that are candidates for inclusion in the
minimum tax base. It is useful to place these items of tax preference into
two categories: the first covers those items of tax preference that should
immediately be included in the minimum tax base. The case for their
inclusion is clear, and they present no conceptual or administrative
problems. In the second category should be listed those items of tax
preference that clearly involve significant revenue losses and whose
inclusion in the minimum tax base is a question requiring further study.
Category I: Items that Should Immediately Be Included in the Mini-
mum Tax Base
1. Intangible Drilling and Development Expenses. The right to de-
duct these expenditures which, under proper tax accounting rules,
should be capitalized and recovered through amortization over the pro-
ductive life of the well, represents a glaring omission from the minimum
tax base. The case for inclusion of this item in the minimum tax rests
on the same ground as does requiring inclusion of the excess of ac-
celerated depreciation over straight-line in the case of real estate. The
proper amount to be included in the minimum tax base is the excess of
the intangible drilling and development expenses deducted over the
amount that would have been deducted in the year had the expenses
been properly capitalized."
2. Interest on Tax-Exempt Bonds. The continued omission of the
interest on tax-exempt bonds from the minimum tax base presents high-
bracket individuals with an opportunity to escape totally any liability
for federal income tax. And, as seen above, tax-exempt bonds play a
significant role in the analysis of tax shelters: many syndicators of tax
shelters recommend that the tax benefits spun-off from the shelters be
invested in tax-exempt bonds. At the same time that tax-exempt interest
is placed in the minimum tax base, Congress should enact a provision
for a federal subsidy of taxable bonds issued by state and local govern-
ments similar to the provision passed by the House in the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.87 As a transition provision, the exemption from minimum
80 This tax preference was included in the allocation of deductions provision in the
House version of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, although not in LTP. H.R. Rep. No.
91413, supra note 69, at 82. Intangibles were included in the list of tax preferences under
the Senate Finance Committee version, S. Rep. No. 91-552, supra note 84, at 114-15, but
the item was deleted in conference, H.R. Rep. No. 91-782, supra note 85, at 302.
87 In 1969, the House included tax-exempt interest in LTP and provided a federal
subsidy for taxable bonds issued by state and local governments. H.R. Rep. No. 91-413,
supra note 69, at 172. Both provisions were deleted in the Senate.
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tax could continue for bonds outstanding on January 1, 1973 so long as
they remained in the hands of the owners of the bonds on that date. The
interest would be subject to the minimum tax in the hands of any subse-
quent transferee, except that the first purchaser from a dealer in munici-
pal bonds would be entitled to the exemption.
3. Construction Period Interest and Taxes. Under present tax rules,
interest and taxes incurred during the construction period of real estate
are currently deductible. In fact, these expenditures represent additional
costs of construction and should properly be capitalized and recovered
through depreciation over the useful life of the property. The amount
deducted in excess of the amount that would be deductible if these
expenses were properly capitalized should be included in the minimum
tax base.
4. Investment Credit. At the present time there is a significant defect
in the investment credit. A taxpayer who makes a qualified investment
is entitled both to the 7% credit and to depreciation with respect to the
amount represented by the credit. Thus an individual making $100 of
qualified investment is entitled to a $7 credit but is also allowed the full
$100 as his depreciation basis. If in such a case depreciation is to be
allowed on the full $100 basis, then the amount of the investment
credit should be included in the income of the taxpayer. Until such time
as measures are taken to correct this defect in the investment credit, the
amount of the investment credit should be subject to the minimum tax 8 8
5. Accrued Gain on Property Transferrede red at Death or by Gift.
One of the most glaring weaknesses in the present income tax system
is the failure to tax accrued gain on transfers at death or by gift. While
this is an income tax problem, it is frequently considered in connection
with estate and gift tax reform." Until such time as full taxation of gain
on property transferred at death or by gift is instituted, such gain should
at least be included in the minimum tax base. In the case of gain
realized on sales or exchanges, the excluded one-half of the capital gain
is included in the minimum tax base. Since the full amount of the gain
is excluded from the normal tax base in the case of accrued gain on
transfers at death or by gift, the proper amount to be included in the
minimum tax base is the full amount of the gain.
88 As originally enacted in 1962, § 48(g) adopted an approach different from that
suggested In the text. It provided for a basis reduction by the amount of the allowable
investment credit. The provision was repealed in 1964. Congress in 1971 instructed the
Treasury and congressional tax committee staffs to "study and develop a basis adjustment
mechanism for consideration within the next two years." S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 45 (1971). Inclusion of the credit in income seems a conceptually more sound
and a much more simple approach to the problem than devising the complex mechanics
needed for the basis adjustment.
89 See Tax Reform Studies, supra note 71, at 331.
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Category II: Items That Should Be Studied Further for Possible In-
clusion in the Minimum Tax Base
1. Exclusion of Interest on Life Insurance Savings. One of the
elements of life insurance proceeds is the amount built up in the policy
that represents interest on saving as opposed to the pure protection ele-
ment in the policy proceeds. Under present tax rules, interest on this
form of saving is completely exempt from income tax, although interest
on competing forms of saving, such as a savings account in a bank, is
taxable. As a policy matter, there appears to be no reason to favor
interest earned on this form of investment as opposed to interest earned
on other types of investments. There are, however, administrative
problems to be worked out in determining the proper amount of interest
allocable to a given policy in a particular year. Nonetheless these prob-
lems do not appear to present overwhelming difficulty, and the estimated
revenue loss of over $1 billion for 1971 for interest on life insurance
savings indicates that this exclusion represents a tax preference of sub-
stantial magnitude."
2. Net Imputed Rental Income from Owner-Occupied Housing.
Another form of investment that is accorded highly preferential treat-
ment by present tax laws is the investment in housing which in effect is
rented by the owner to himself While interest and taxes with respect
to owner-occupied housing are fully deductible, the rental value of the
property is not included in the income tax base. It is estimated that
approximately a $5 billion revenue loss results annually from the failure
to tax this net rental income (net imputed rental income equals rental
value minus interest, maintenance and repair expenses, and deprecia-
tion). Because of the exemption for individuals from minimum tax
liability suggested below, most home owners would not, of course, be
subjected to the minimum tax by virtue of inclusion of this item in the
minimum tax base. Nonetheless, the benefits of this preference increase
substantially with income, and there appears to be no reason why those
who have large amounts of other preference income should be able to
escape tax on this particular form of investment income. There are
problems of valuation but these do not appear insurmountable. Because
of the large revenue loss involved the matter deserves serious study."
3. Social Security Benefits. The exclusion of social security bene-
fits from the normal income tax base involves an annual revenue loss of
almost $3 billion. This exclusion can hardly be justified on the basis of
assisting taxpayers with below-poverty-level incomes, since the low-
income allowance and personal exemptions in fact exempt from federal
oe See R. Goode, The Individual Income Tax 130-39 (1964).
Di See Aaron, Income Taxes and Housing, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 789 (1970).
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income tax those individuals whose total income does not reach the
poverty level. Reform proposals submitted by the Treasury in 1965 and
1968 in connection with reform of the taxation of the elderly were re-
jected by Congress." Nonetheless, inclusion of the social security pay-
ments in the minimum tax base appears an entirely appropriate step.
For most social security recipients, of course, the minimum tax exemp-
tion provided below will continue to insure that no tax liability will be
incurred with respect to their social security payments. However, there
appears to be no policy reason why persons who have retired with high
amounts of tax preference income should also be entitled to exclude
social security payments. Thus these payments should be includible in
the minimum tax base so that they will generate at least some tax
liability where the individual recipient also has large amounts of other
tax preference income.
There are other items that conceptually would appear proper for
possible inclusion in the minimum tax base, but those listed above ap-
pear to be the most likely candidates for inclusion at the present time.
Immediate inclusion of the items in Category I in the minimum tax base
will go a long way toward insuring that the avowed purpose of the
minimum tax is met, i.e. that each individual and corporation will make
some significant contribution to the cost of government. The items in
Category II deserve further study since the amounts of revenue in-
volved are very large and the benefits of the exclusion for the very
wealthy seem disproportionately large if not subject to the minimum
tax.
C. Changes in the Rate of the Minimum Tax
With respect to individuals, one of the problems with the present
minimum tax system is that it imposes a proportional tax on top of a
progressive rate structure. It is true that the existence of the $30,000
exemption and the deduction of regular taxes from the minimum tax
base" provide a type of progressivity within the minimum tax structure
itself, but only if one considers the minimum tax alone. Moreover, the
existence of the $30,000 exemption reduces the overall progressive im-
pact of the minimum tax when it is considered in conjunction with the
regular tax system. That is to say, the $30,000 exemption for tax
preferences allows a taxpayer to start all over again at the bottom of
the minimum tax structure, whereas in a truly progressive overall
system the tax preference liability should be added onto the regular tax
liability in an incremental fashion.
02 See, e.g., Tax Reform Studies, supra note 71, at 231.
98 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, {§ 56(a)(1)1 (2).
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Further, the deduction for regular taxes produces a progressivity in
the minimum tax that is inverse to the progressivity of the regular tax.
In other words, the higher the regular taxes paid, the lower the mini-
mum tax; and, conversely, the lower the regular tax paid, the higher the
minimum tax. The net result of this system is that two people with
identical tax preferences may pay different amounts of minimum tax,
a result that is at variance with the additive nature of the minimum tax,
albeit consistent with the comparative approach of the 1968 Treasury
minimum tax proposal. The minimum tax will perform its function
better if it is integrated in principle with the progressive nature of the
regular income tax. That is to say, a dollar of tax preference should
bear a higher marginal tax rate in all situations, aside from the small
exemption suggested below. As noted, the present minimum tax has
both additive and comparative aspects. Nonetheless the basic premise
of the minimum tax now provided in sections 56-58 appears to be that
the minimum tax is an additional tax on tax-preferred income. On
balance it seems desirable to build on this concept and effect a minimum
tax which enhances the progressivity of the regular tax system.
For individuals the minimum tax rate structure should be amended
to provide graduated rates at one-half the normal rates. Thus the
minimum tax rates could range, for example, from 7% to 35%. Brackets
of minimum taxable income could correspond in size to those applicable
to regular taxable income." For corporations, which in general are not
taxed under a progressive rate structure, the minimum tax rate can
remain a flat rate. Because of the increase in minimum tax rates appli-
cable to individuals, it would appear appropriate to provide a minimum
tax rate for corporations of about 20%.
In order to insure that the proposed progressive minimum tax rates
for individuals operate as a direct supplement to the progressivity of
the regular tax rate structure, the deduction for regular taxes from
the minimum tax base should be repealed. Thus each dollar of minimum
taxable income should be taxed at a progressively higher rate on an
absolute basis, rather than inversely to normal tax liability. Such a step
would materially increase the overall progressivity of the income tax
system.
04 The primary effect of such a change would be on capital gains. The proposed rate
structure would increase the present 36.5% maximum capital gain rate (regular tax plus
minimum tax) to 52.5%. This change with respect to the top capital gain rate should be
compared to the increase in top capital gain rates from 25% to 36.5% enacted In 1969.
Economists do not appear to have found that the 1969 change had an adverse effect on
investment. It should also be noted that the operation of the maximum tax can increase
the capital gain rate to 46.5% under present rules; see Federal Income Taxation, supra
note 43, at 940-41. The repeal of the maximum tax in its entirety would be a welcome
reform in conjunction with the proposed changes in the minimum tax.
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D. Change in Exemption
At the present time, the effectiveness of the minimum tax is
substantially impaired by the existence of the $30,000 exemption for
minimum tax purposes. Presumably the purpose of any exemption
from the minimum tax is to insure that persons with relatively small
amounts of preference income are not subject to the minimum tax. Thus,
for individuals, the $30,000 exemption operates somewhat like the per-
sonal exemption and standard deduction, including the low-income al-
lowance, that individuals take in computing their regular tax liability.
There is a certain anomaly in granting an exemption above and
beyond the personal exemption to anyone who has used tax preferences
materially to reduce or escape regular tax liability." Nonetheless, some
argument for a small exemption can be made on the basis of administra-
tive convenience. The present $30,000 minimum tax exemption, how-
ever, far exceeds the amount required by administrative considerations.
For individuals, therefore, the $30,000 flat exemption should be
converted to a $5,000 vanishing exemption. The $5,000 floor would
insure that persons with relatively small amounts of preference income
would not need to compute and pay a minimum tax. However, the
$5,000 exemption should be phased out to disappear once $10,000 of
tax preferences is reached. The argument for administrative con-
venience does not apply where preference income exceeds $10,000 per
year. Nor does a taxpayer with this amount of preference income
appear to be an appropriate candidate for an exemption in addition to
the ones granted in computing regular personal tax liability.
For corporations, no exemption should be available. Neither rea-
sons of administrative convenience nor tax concepts justify an exemp-
tion for corporations.
E. Structural Changes in the Minimum Tax
1. Treatment of Deferral Items
The principal structural defect in the present minimum tax system
is its failure to distinguish between tax preferences that amount to out-
right exemptions and those that involve tax deferral. No problems are
involved in applying the minimum tax to exemption items. The tax is
imposed in the year the exemption is taken and, in effect, the amount
of the exemption is reduced.
96 Providing a $30,000 exemption for minimum tax purposes has ironic overtones
when compared with the basic $750 personal exemption for regular tax purposes. A $750
personal exemption is provided to help a taxpayer meet the necessities of life; but once be
has demonstrated that he has no financial difficulty in providing those necessities and has
attained a marginal bracket where tax preferences are beneficial, an exemption 40 times
as great is granted.
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However, the problem is different with respect to deferral items.
Here the minimum tax may be imposed on an amount which itself is
later subject to regular taxation, but present rules do not permit any
adjustment in the subsequent year for the minimum tax previously paid.
Thus, for example, the minimum tax may be applied in the case of the
rapid amortization of pollution control facilities to tax the amount by
which the amortization allowable exceeds depreciation otherwise allow-
able with respect to the property. In a subsequent disposition of the
facility the entire depreciation will be subject to section 1245 recapture
and taxed at ordinary income rates. In theory it would appear that some
adjustment should be made in the year of disposition for the minimum
tax previously paid.
Under the present system, there may be some justification for not
getting involved in the complexities of adjustments for deferral items.
A deferral item is involved; thus it can be argued that the minimum tax
in the above situation may be viewed as an interest charge on the tax
loan. If so, it is a highly erratic way of charging interest: the interest
charge varies with the length of the deferral period, the taxpayer's tax
rate, and the return which the taxpayer can realize on investment of the
deferred taxes. For example, the shorter the deferral the higher the
interest rate."
While this degree of inexactitude may be tolerable when the mini-
mum tax rate is only 10%, it is probably not acceptable if minimum
tax rates of up to 35% are adopted. Therefore, if a higher progressive
rate structure is adopted for the minimum tax, as recommended above,
taxpayers should be entitled to an adjustment for the minimum tax paid
to the extent that an item subject to the minimum tax is subsequently
included in the regular tax base. Here the best solution appears to be
that upon disposition of deferral property a tax credit be allowed for
the minimum tax previously paid. The credit would have to be adjusted
to reflect the period of time over which the property was held. The
credit should thus be highest for shorter-term deferrals—because the
taxpayer has had the use of the federal tax monies for a shorter period
of time. As the length of deferral increases, the credit should corres-
pondingly be reduced by a predetermined percentage each year. The
reduction percentage could be determined by reference to an average tax
bracket (say 40-50%) and an assumed discount rate."
It is possible to achieve something of the same result as outlined
above by basis adjustments with respect to deferral items subject to
9 See McDaniel & KapBosky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat
Air and Water Pollution: A Case Study in Tax Expenditures, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
351, 363 (1971).
9T The credit mechanism outlined in the text was developed by Professor Stanley S.
Surrey, Harvard Law School, and I am indebted to him for sharing his analysis.
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the minimum tax. This approach, however, appears to involve greater
complexity than the credit approach.
2. The Averaging Device
Under the present minimum tax, a special averaging device is pro-
vided which permits a taxpayer to carry over for seven years the excess
of the regular tax for a given year over tax preferences less $30,000.
The effect is to reduce minimum tax liability in the subsequent years
because the taxes carried over are deducted for minimum tax purposes
just as are regular taxes incurred in such years. Under the proposal
made above, however, the deduction for regular taxes would be elimi-
nated. The question then is whether an averaging device should be pro-
vided under the revised system.
The need for an averaging device depends upon one's view, of the
minimum tax. If it is seen as a special tax structure against which an
individual's tax preference income is to be checked each year, then an
averaging device is probably not appropriate. Such an approach seems
especially justified under the present minimum tax structure. After the
proposed revision of the minimum tax set forth above, however, averag-
ing for minimum tax purposes would seem appropriate. An approach like
that in present sections 1301-05 could be adopted for the minimum tax
so that, in effect, minimum tax liability would be averaged over a period
of, say, five years.
F. Supportive Provisions for the Minimum Tax
While a strengthened minimum tax would be an appropriate re-
sponse to tax-sheltered income and other tax preferences, it would not
alone provide adequate limitations on all tax preferences. Thus, for
example, under the recommendations outlined above, the minimum tax
would have no direct effect on special itemized personal deductions."
It does not deal with the problem of allowing the deduction of interest
incurred to carry investments which will be sold at capital gain rates.
Nor does it lend itself readily to resolution of the "farm loss" problem,
which is a preference arising in large part from tax accounting rules
rather than from specific tax expenditure provisions. Therefore the
minimum tax needs several backstopping measures to deal with these
special tax preference problems. The following steps are recommended:
1. Adoption of the allocation of deductions proposal. While a
minimum tax reduces the extent to which an individual can escape
98 The present minimum tax has an erratic effect on itemized personal deductions
because of the deduction for regular tax liability from the minimum tax base: the higher
the amount of personal deductions, the lower the regular tax liability, and, hence, the
higher the minimum tax liability.
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proper tax liability, the preferences are enhanced in value if personal
expenditures can be deducted in full against taxable income. The alloca-
tion of deductions provision adopted by the House in 1969 9° represents
an appropriate response to this problem. It should now be reconsidered
and adopted, with an expanded list of preference items, regardless of
the action taken with respect to the minimum tax.
2. Limitation on interest deduction. Section 163 (d) imposes a limit
on the extent to which the interest deduction can be taken against
ordinary income where the asset being carried by the loan is sold at
capital gain rates. A minimum tax, depending upon the rates adopted,
may adequately deal with this problem. The present minimum tax
certainly does not. Therefore the provisions limiting the deduction for
interest should be retained and strengthened. The present $25,000 ex-
emption is much too high and should be reduced to $5000. In addition,
the entire excess deduction, not just one-half, should be disallowed,
subject to being carried forward and utilized against investment income
in subsequent years.'
3. Farm "losses." The farm "loss" problem arises primarily from
accounting rules developed for a smaller and more simple agricultural
economy. These rules permit a significant tax deferral to be achieved
by nonfarmers who utilize them to produce "losses" that reduce tax on
their non-farm income 101 The minimum tax, as noted above, is limited
as a tool for dealing with deferral items. A separate provision directed
specifically at the farm "loss" problem would appear a better means of
attacking the deferral involved in the cash accounting rules for farmers.
Section 1251 of the Code represents an attempt to cope with the prob-
lem, but it is limited in scope and approaches the problem from the
wrong direction. That is, the Excess Deduction Account (EDA) ap-
proach in section 1251 is a recapture provision and thus permits tax
deferral to continue in the farm "loss" area. A more appropriate
response would be that recommended by the 1968 Treasury Tax Re-
form Studies and Proposals, 02 which proposed the disallowance of all
deductions for farm "losses" to the extent they exceeded farm income
plus $15,000. Such an approach deals directly with the deferral prob-
lem, leaving the issue of the treatment of gain on the sale of farm
property to be resolved in the context of capital gain rules generally.
99 H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, supra note 69, at 80.
100 This was the approach adopted by the House in 1969 in its version of present
163(d). See H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, supra note 69, at 72-73.
101 See Statement of Prof. Charles Davenport, Panel No. 5 (Feb. 20, 1973), in Pre-
pared Statements Submitted by Witnesses Invited to Appear Before the Committee on
Ways and Means to Participate in Panel Discussions on Tax Reform, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
102 Supra note 71, at 152.
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The 1968 Treasury Proposal should be adopted in order to supplement
effectively the minimum tax in the farm "loss" area.
IV. AFTERWORD
On April 30, 1973, the Treasury Department submitted its Pro-
posals for Tax Changes to the House Ways and Means Committee.
The package is a mixture of proposed tax reforms and new tax expendi-
tures!" In general the Treasury recommendations conform to those
anticipated in the Forward to this article. The Treasury proposals will
be subjected to analysis in depth and detail beyond the scope of this
article. But some preliminary comparisons to the suggestions set forth
in Sections H and III, above, are in order.
A. Treasury Proposals and Tax Shelters
The Treasury proposes to deal with the problem of tax shelters
through its new Limitation on Artificial Accounting Losses (LAL) 106
Under this proposal, "artificial losses" resulting from acceleration of
deductions cannot shelter "unrelated income" of the taxpayer. In gen-
eral, if in a given year accelerated deductions generated by an activity
exceed the income derived from that activity, the excess deductions must
be placed in a suspense account (called a Deferred Loss Account
(DLA)) and can be deducted only in the future against income gen-
erated by the activity. Accelerated deductions subject to LAL include
the intangible drilling and development expense deduction, accelerated
depreciation, construction period interest and taxes, deductions from
farm operations, investment interest deductions (in some situations),
and other deductions that "will from time to time be specifically identi-
fied by regulation where it appears that they are being used as tax
shelters."'"
More technically, an "artificial loss" is the amount by which the
103 Department of the Treasury, Proposals For Tax Change (April 30, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Proposals].
164 Thus on the reform side the Treasury submitted recommendations to strengthen
the minimum tax, to deal with tax shelters, and to provide a federal subsidy for taxable
municipal bonds. See Proposals, supra note 103, at 83, 94, and 143. In addition, some
particularized reforms were advanced to deal with arbitrage securities and taxation of
U.S. business operations abroad. See Proposals at 148, 159, and 169.
As new tax expenditures, the Treasury recommended tax credits for property taxes
paid by the elderly, for tuition paid to private schools, and for domestic oil and gas
drilling and exploration expenditures. See Proposals at 118, 126, and 135.
In addition, in an effort to secure "simplification," the Treasury proposed a $500
standard deduction for certain itemized deductions which would, however, operate as an
itemized deduction itself.
105 Proposals, supra note 103, at 94.
700 Id. at 97.
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accelerated deductions for the year exceed "associated net related in-
come" (ANRI) for the year. Net related income (NRI) is computed
by ignoring the accelerated deductions (e.g., in the case of accelerated
depreciation by using only straight-line depreciation). Accelerated
deductions are allowed as deductions only to the extent of net related
income and any excess must be added to the Deferred Loss Account.
As income is generated by the activity in a subsequent year, an amount
equal to the excess of NRI over accelerated deductions for that year
will be subtracted from the account and allowed as a deduction in that
year.'"
In the case of residential real estate, related income is computed by
aggregating income from all residential real estate plus income from the
sales of housing held primarily for sale to customers. Aggregation is
also permitted for oil and gas properties.'" But in the case of other
potential tax shelter activities, accelerated deductions apparently would
be allowed only to the extent of the income generated by the particular
property involved.
Where the proceeds from a sale of property do not constitute
related income, the balance in the Deferred Loss Account attributable
to the property would be subtracted from the account and added to the
basis of the property.'"
A partnership or Subchapter S Corporation would make the LAL
computation at the entity level and then pass through to each individual
partner or shareholder his distributive or ratable share of the LAL
item."°
What would be the impact of LAL on the tax shelter investments
analyzed in Section II of this article? In general, it can be concluded
that LAL has a decided impact on each of the elements that produces
the present tax shelter device. Thus the pure shelter aspect is eliminated.
No longer, for example, would accelerated depreciation from a real
estate project be available to offset earned income, dividends, and royal-
ties; accelerated depreciation on buildings could only be deducted
against income generated from buildings. Deferral of tax is likewise
eliminated by requiring that accelerated deductions match income; the
deductions only become available as the income is generated. The use
of leverage appears less attractive since deductions for accelerated
depreciation will more closely parallel repayment of the principal of
the loan. Finally, LAL appears to eliminate the negative income tax
feature noted above, which resulted from allowing deductions against
ordinary income but taxing gain on the sale at capital gain rates. For
107 Id.
1°B Id. at 98, 99.
100 Id. at 102.
110 Id. at 103-04.
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example, assume that a taxpayer purchased an asset for $100 and could
deduct the entire cost in year one. The property generated no income
in year 1 so no deduction would be permitted under LAL; the tax-
payer would add the $100 to his Deferred Loss Account. Upon a sale
in year 2, the tax basis of zero would be increased by the $100 in the
Deferred Loss Account, leaving the taxpayer with no gain and no de-
ductions in the transaction. Thus LAL correlates the tax result to the
economic result of the transaction, a resolution that is not achieved
under present law.
LAL apparently would not apply to the sample syndicated real
estate tax shelter in Appendix A because it is an FHA 236 project?'
LAL is, however, applicable to non-federally subsidized housing tax
shelters. If LAL did affect FHA 236 projects, it would appear to dis-
allow the excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-line deprecia-
tion through year 18 of the project in Appendix A. This result would
materially impair the attractiveness of the investment to high-bracket
taxpayers.
In order to analyze the impact of LAL on oil and gas tax shelter
arrangements, the Treasury's recommendation to provide still more tax
benefits to the oil and gas industry must be taken into account. The
Treasury's April 30 proposals included the President's recommendation
to provide a 7% investment credit for domestic exploration and drilling,
with an additional 5% credit for successful wells."2
We can analyze the impact of LAL (plus that of the new credits)
on the example set forth in Section 11.13. Assuming no other income
from oil investments by the investor in the sample drilling project, LAL
would deny the $900,000 intangibles deduction in year 1; that amount
would go into a Deferred Loss Account. However, in year 1, a tax credit
of $63,000 would be available under the President's proposal.
In year 2 net related income would be the $100,000 in income gen-
erated by the property. Hence the deductions resulting from subtrac-
tions from the DLA would eliminate tax liability on income generated
by the well in year 2, i.e., an investor could receive $100,000 free of
tax. In addition, the investor would receive $33,000 tax-free income
from percentage depletion and the 5% supplemental investment credit
would produce a tax benefit of $45,000. Upon sale in year 3 for
$900,000, the balance in the DLA of $800,000 would be added to the
tax basis of $100,000, producing a break-even situation. Thus, by
virtue of LAL the tax benefits from the investment are confined to
111 PITA 236 projects may be exempt from LAL; Proposals, supra note 103, at 103.
in proposals, supra note 103, at 135. The proposed credit is 7% of intangible drilling
and development expense costs (plus certain geological and geophysical costs). Tithe well
is successful, a supplemental credit equal to 5% of such costs is allowed.
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percentage depletion ($33,000) and the proposed investment credit
($108,000).
The above results may be illustrated in the following diagram: 113
Investor's
Net
Year 1: 	 Deductible	 Tax	 After-Tax
Investment	 Intangibles	 Benefit	 Investment
$1,000,000	 $900,000	 $ 63,000	 $937,000
5%	 Net
Year 2: 	 Percentage	 Deduction	 Investment	 After-Tax
Net Income	 Depletion	 From DLA	 Credit	 Cash
$ 100,000	 $ 33,000	 $100,000	 $45,000	 $178,000
Year 3:
After-Tax Cash
From Year 2 Income	 Net	 Net
and From Sale	 After-Tax	 After-Tax
Proceeds	 Investment	 Profit
$1,078,000	 $937,000	 $141,000
As a result of LAL, the net after-tax profit for the investor in the
example has been reduced from $303,100 to $141,000. If the proposed
investment credit for oil were removed from the example, the after-tax
profit would be reduced to $33,000, the amount of the percentage deple-
tion allowance. In this latter situation, the investor would have done
better if he had just placed his $1 million in a savings account.
LAL thus appears quite effective in dealing with the oil tax shelter
as presently constituted. However, its effectiveness will be diluted if
the new investment credit is enacted and made available to investors
in a syndicated drilling fund.
With respect to the sample equipment leasing tax shelter described
in Appendix B, where a net lease is involved, LAL applies to treat as
an artificial loss the amount by which the five-year rapid amortization
exceeds straight-line depreciation. The only related income from which
the artificial loss can subsequently be deducted is income from the
leased property itself. No aggregation of income from a number of
leasing transactions is permitted, in contrast to the treatment of oil
and gas and real estate properties. Thus, in the example in Appendix B
the excess of rapid amortization over straight-line depreciation can be
deducted only from the rental income subsequently generated by the
particular leased property. If we assume that the interest deduction is
fully allowable in computing related income and that the projected
118 Compare the diagram, p. 828 supra.
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rental income in Schedule A in Appendix B is maintained, then the LAL
computation for an investor would be as follows:




Straight-line Depreciation 	 11,626 	 23,442
Net Related Income
	 ($10,233)
Rapid amortization would exceed straight-line depreciation in each of
the first five years of the lease by $21,641 ($34,267 minus $11,626).
This amount therefore would not be deductible by the investor in any
of these years, but would be deferred until years 6 through 15 when
the project would generate net related income.
LAL does not purport to deal directly with the interest deductible
in arriving at adjusted gross income. Nonetheless, it appears from the
application of LAL to the leveraged leasing transaction in Appendix B
that it will not be possible to use leverage (with corresponding interest
deductions) to purchase accelerated depreciation deductions. This re-
sults from the fact that interest on the loan reduced net related income
to a point that the excess of rapid amortization over straight-line depre-
ciation was required to be deferred in its entirety in each of the first
five years of the lease. It seems safe to predict that leveraged transac-
tions to acquire straight-line depreciation deductions are unlikely to
have the requisite appeal to tax conscious investors.
On the other hand, in the example in Appendix B, the combination
of the interest deduction plus straight-line depreciation still produces a
loss in each of the first five years. Some shelter potential thus would
remain even after LAL. Perhaps the answer here is that part of the
interest for the first five years shown in Schedule A of Appendix B in
fact should be disallowed under the Internal Revenue Service prepaid
interest rules.'" But, as discussed below, more stringent rules with
respect to the deduction for investment interest may be warranted.
How should the tax reformers in Congress react to LAL? On the
whole, a preliminary examination of the proposal seems to indicate that
it would generally be quite effective to deal with the problems created
by high-bracket professionals and business executives investing in tax
shelter transactions. The underlying theme of the Treasury proposal is
that LAL is designed to deny tax benefits intended for a particular in-
dustry to persons not engaged to any significant extent in that activity.
But some structural changes in LAL should be considered. First,
the Treasury may be overly optimistic in its view that section 163(d)
114 See Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 76.
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is rendered unnecessary by LAL. The prepaid interest rules may not
prove sufficient to deal with the problem of interest incurred to carry
investment assets. Further analysis appears in order to determine if
there would not be a role to be played by a strengthened section 163 (d)
properly integrated with LAL.
Second, LAL does not apply to corporations. While the Treasury
apparently accepts the proposition that businesses for which special
tax benefits have been granted should be able to eliminate tax on the
income generated by their business activity, it does not follow that
banks should be able to eliminate tax on their banking income by uti-
lizing, through leasing transactions, tax preferences intended for plant
equipment and machinery. Again, more analysis is required to deter-
mine whether there is a proper role for the LAL principle in corporate
tax shelter transactions.
Finally, LAL seems too lenient even with respect to persons en-
gaged full time in activities for which special tax preferences have been
accorded. So long as a real estate developer, for example, continues to
expand his activities, LAL may never apply. Thus a proper matching
of income-producing properties with new projects generating accelerated
deductions will still permit full utilization of the deductions unhindered
by LAL. And since, as discussed below, the Treasury proposes to re-
move all deferral items from its minimum tax, it would apparently be
possible for oil drillers, real estate developers, farm operators, and
movie producers to eliminate, by proper planning, any liability for
federal income tax.'" While one can understand the Treasury's desire
to avoid the complications in the minimum tax that inclusion of deferral
items would involve, it does appear that some shoring up of LAL (or
the minimum tax) is required to avoid such consequences.
B. Treasury Proposals and the Minimum Tax
The Treasury's Minimum Taxable Income (MTI) proposal is
intended to "prevent the combination of exclusions and itemized deduc-
tions from off-setting more than one-half of a taxpayer's income, and
every individual will be required to pay tax on at least the balance"'
As noted above, MTI applies only to enumerated items completely
110 Standing alone, the proposals for a refundable tax credit made in Section II, p. 838
supra, might appear to assume a like result. This would not be the case, however, since the
investment credit and deferral items would be included in the minimum tax as proposed
in Section III. Hence some tax contribution would be required even from persons for
whom tax preferences are intended.
It is of interest to note that the refundable credit is a feature of the Treasury's
proposals for tax credits for property taxes paid by the elderly and for private school
tuition costs.
110 Proposals, supra note 103, at 83. The Treasury MTI system would apply only to
individuals. The present 10% minimum tax would continue to apply to corporations.
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excluded from gross income; it does not apply to tax preferences ac-
corded through a deferral mechanism. The four exclusions are: (1)
percentage depletion in excess of adjusted basis; (2) the excluded one-
half of net long-term capital gain; (3) in the case of a qualified or
restricted stock option, the amount by which the fair market value of
the stock at the time of exercise of the option exceeds the option price;
and (4) income earned outside the United States which is exempt under
section 911.
To determine an individual's liability under MTI, he must, after
computing his taxable income under regular rules, compute his "mini-
mum taxable income." If the latter exceeds the regular taxable income,
then the usual progressive rate schedule is applied to determine tax
liability.
Minimum taxable income is arrived at by adding to adjusted gross
income the amount of the four preference items. From this total is
subtracted the amount of the taxpayer's personal exemptions, a basic
$10,000 exemption, extraordinary medical expenses and casualty losses
(amounts in excess of 10% of AGI plus exempt covered by MTI), and
investment interest and expenses (to the extent such items equal invest-
ment income). The result of the computation is the taxpayer's "MTI
Base," which is then divided by two to arrive at "minimum taxable
income."
The MTI proposal thus returns to the concept that a minimum
tax system should be comparative and progressive. One can readily
agree with the progressivity aspect of MTI, but the comparative feature
must be more carefully analyzed.
It is helpful to compare the proposed MTI with the suggestions
for strengthening the present minimum tax advanced in Section III of
this article. First, as to income items, MTI shares the same defects of
omission as the present minimum tax. Tax-exempt interest is not in-
cluded in the MTI Base nor is the accrued gain on property transferred
by gift or at death. The omission of tax-exempt interest means, of
course, that MTI cannot fulfill its laudable purpose; omission of ac-
crued gain substantially weakens its impact. Thus the suggestions in
Section III for items to be included in the present minimum tax base
are also applicable to MTI.
In addition, MTI has no direct impact on capital gain rates. Thus,
an individual whose income is $1 million derived solely from capital
gains would be totally unaffected by MTI. If the taxpayer has other
items of tax preference or personal deductions, then the presence of
capital gains in the MTI Base will serve to use up all or part of the
50 percent of permissible tax preferences, thus perhaps causing such
other items to be disallowed under MTI. The treatment of capital gains
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by MTI may be compared to this writer's recommendations and to the
present minimum tax. Thus under the proposal in Section III, a single
individual with $1 million of capital gain income would pay a minimum
tax of approximately $75,000117
 plus some $333,000 in regular tax. The
present minimum tax on the $500,000 of excluded gain would be about
$13,700 [10%X ($500,000 minus $30,000 minus $333,000)], which
would be added to the $333,000 normal tax.
Thus, as was suggested by the analysis in Section HI, a decision
to adopt a comparative approach or an additive approach in a minimum
tax system may turn on the question of what one wishes to do about
capital gains. The Nixon Administration has consistently opposed efforts
to narrow the tax gap between capital gains and ordinary income. Its
advocacy of a comparative minimum tax is consistent with this record.
But for those who wish to bring the tax burden on capital gain income
more closely in line with that borne by ordinary income, the additive
approach (coupled with a progressive rate structure) may be preferable.
Of course, one can structure MTI to have a direct impact on capital
gain rates by, for example, permitting only 40 percent of total income
to be excluded from the MTI Base.
As to deduction items, the MTI proposal is interesting on a number
of counts. Its most important feature is its elevation of itemized per-
sonal deductions to membership in the hierarchy of tax preferences
coordinate with percentage depletion, capital gains, and the like. For
an excessive amount of itemized personal deductions brings MTI into
operation just as will the presence of excessive amounts of preference
income. Thus, for a single individual with $1 million of ordinary income
from salary and dividends, MTI will disallow itemized personal deduc-
tions in excess of $510,750. In such a case, neither the minimum tax
nor the allocation of deductions proposals in Section III would have
any impact on itemized personal deductions regardless of amount.
The MTI policy stance toward itemized personal deductions is
thus quite different from the policy for an allocation of deductions
provision. The latter proposal assumes the validity of the itemized
personal deductions per se; it only operates to disallow such deductions
when they are used in conjunction with exempt income. If no exempt
income is involved, there is assumed to be no abuse. MTI, on the other
hand, is based on the proposition that itemized personal deductions,
if present to an excessive degree, can result in the same unacceptable
low levels of tax liability as are produced by large amounts of exempt
income. Hence MTI would operate to disallow personal deductions even
if no exempt income is present in the taxpayer's income make-up.
117
 Assuming one-half normal rates were applied to tax brackets under a progressive
minimum tax which corresponded to regular tax brackets.
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It is difficult to evaluate MTI's effect on personal deductions as
compared to an allocation of deductions provision. For example, assume
that a taxpayer has $1 million of income, of which $250,000 is capital
gain. He also has $250,000 of itemized personal deductions. MTI would
have no effect in this case, either on the itemized personal deductions
or on the capital gains. But the allocation of deductions proposal would
operate to disallow approximately one-eighth of the itemized deduc-
tions. And the strengthened minimum tax suggested in Section III
would also apply to the capital gain income.
It should be noted parenthetically that MTI does contain a type
of allocation of deductions system within itself. Thus "ordinary" med-
ical expenses and casualty losses are allocated to the preference cate-
gory; extraordinary amounts of these two items are allowed to be
deducted in arriving at the MTI Base. Similarly, only investment in-
terest and expenses in excess of investment income are considered as
preference items; such expenditures are deductible in arriving at the
MTI Base to the extent of investment income.
A Congressman interested in tax reform with respect to itemized
personal deductions really need not make a choice between either an
MTI approach or an allocation of dedUctions rule. For it appears that
both could be adopted. That is, itemized deductions could be treated
as items of tax preference under MTI, and then still be subject to
allocation between exempt and tax-exempt income to the extent not
disallowed by MTI. Each proposal stands on a sound conceptual base
and, properly integrated, could combine to reduce substantially the
erosion of the tax base by the present itemized personal deductions.
The MTI proposal must also be compared with a more effective
section 163 (d) limit on the interest expense deduction, as recommended
in Section III above. MTI only affects interest deductible from AGI to
the extent such interest exceeds investment income. Under the Treasury
proposal, if MTI would operate to disallow a deduction for investment
interest, the taxpayer is granted an option to treat such interest expense
as an artificial accounting loss under LAL. The deduction would then
be deferred until receipt of related income from the investment, rather
than being disallowed.
Thus as to interest deductible from AGI, MTI, where applicable,
is stronger than the present section 163(d) treatment. For if MTI
applies, the excess investment interest deduction is either disallowed
completely or is required to be deferred in its entirety (not just to the
extent of one-half as under section 163(d)). But MTI disallows excess
investment interest only as a function of its relation (plus other itemized
deductions and exempt income) to AGI expanded by the MTI exclusion
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items. Section 163 (d), if amended as recommended in Section HI,
would be operative wherever investment interest exceeded investment
income and would then apply the LAL deferral technique to the entire
excess deduction. In addition, a strengthened section 163 (d) approach
appears to avoid the problems that would be encountered under MTI
and LAL of determining whether interest is properly deductible to or
from AGI. On balance, therefore, the approach of section 163(d) rec-
ommended in Section III appears preferable to the MTI-LAL proposals
in dealing with the problem of excess investment interest.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposals of the Treasury on April 20, 1973, dealing with the
problems of tax shelters and tax preferences appear to verify the judg-
ment expressed at the outset of this article that these two areas repre-
sent the most promising candidates for immediate income tax reform.
The Treasury MTI and LAL proposals, despite some reservations out-
lined above, represent a significant and useful source of support for
such reform and are therefore to be commended. The task of tax-reform
minded Congressmen and their staffs is to analyze the Treasury pro-
posals and compare them to alternative methods of strengthening the
tax rules dealing with tax shelter devices and tax preferences. With the
submission of the Treasury tax proposals, significant improvement in
the equity of our tax structure during the Ninety-Third Congress
appears a realistic possibility.
APPENDIX A





In Units of $50,000 Each
(An FHA 236 Development)
* * * * *
This memorandum describes a transaction in which a selected
group of investors (the "Limited Partners") will be offered and en-
titled to purchase limited partnership interests (the "Units") in XYZ
Estates Co., a limited partnership organized to acquire, own and de-
velop a 500 unit low and moderate income garden apartment project.
* * * * *
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Capital Contributions
The Limited Partners will contribute a total of $1,400,000 to the
capital of the Partnership and will not be required to make any other
capital contributions Each Limited Partner will make his capital
contribution to the Partnership in three equal installments: one-third
at the time of his admission, one-third on June 1, 1971, and one-third
either on June 1, 1972, or upon completion of construction, whichever
is later.
The Limited Partners will be entitled to share 95% of all profits
and losses and 95% of cash flow from the normal rental operations
of the Partnership from January 1, 1970 until twenty years after final
endorsement of the mortgage note (the "Final Endorsement") by the
Federal Housing Administration (the "FHA") and 50% thereafter.
(See Exhibit A). Final Endorsement is expected to occur in August of
1971, which is shortly after the projected time for substantial comple-
tion of construction.
Construction Mortgage
FHA insured construction financing in the amount of $8,905,000
has been obtained under a participation agreement whereby 95% of
the construction loan is held by Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion (FNMA) and 5% by the Ames National Bank which will also
administer the loan. The interest rate on the loan is 8.5% together
with an additional financing fee in the amount of 2% of the mortgage
($178,100) which was paid at Initial Endorsement.
Permanent Mortgage
A permanent mortgage commitment in the amount of $8,905,000,
at an interest rate of 8.5% has also been obtained from FNMA. The
price of this mortgage commitment is 1.5% of the mortgage ($133,575)
of which 1% ($89,050) was paid to FNMA at Initial Endorsement and
Y2
 of 1% ($44,525) will be paid at Final Endorsement.***
Neither the Partnership nor any Partner will have any personal
liability for repayment of either the Construction Mortgage or Per-
manent Mortgage.***
Payback Period
Estimated period of time for a Limited Partner's Investment to
be recovered through tax savings and distributions of cash flow (see
Exhibit C):
30% 	 60%
Timing 	 Tax Bracket 	 Tax Bracket
First Installment 1 year, 3 months 1 year, 0 months
Second Installment 1 year, 10 months 1 year, 3 months
Third Installment 2 years, 9 months 1 year, 11 months
862
TAX REFORM, TAX SHELTERS AND TAX PREFERENCES
Rate of Return
Estimated Rate of Return for a Limited Partner's Investment
as shown in Exhibit D:
Limited Partner's 	 After Tax	 Equivalent Pre-Tax
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ILLUSTRATION POE A 70% TAX BRACKET INVESTOR OP THE SINKING FUND METHOD OF


























1972 24,405 13,601 $10,804
1973 24,405 6,725 $17,680 $	 211 $17,891
1974 24,405 24,405 1,372 43,668
1975 12,518 12,518 2,459 58,645
1976 ( 4,631) ( 4.631) 2,899 56,913
1977 ( 5,169) ( 5,169) 2,803 54,547
1978 ( 5,760) ( 5,760) 2,670 51,457
1979 ( 6,408) ( 6.408) 2,500 47,549
1980 ( 7,119) ( 7,119) 2,287 42,717
1981 ( 7,900) ( 7,900) 2,017 36,844
1982 ( 8,756) ( 8,756) 1,711 29,799
1983 ( 9,696) ( 9,696) 1,335 21,438
1984 (10,727) (10,727) 888 11,599
1985 (11,964) (E) (11,964) 365 0
$50,000 (F) $17,529 (F) $23,527 $23,527
Average period of investment (D) 13.92 Months
Assumptions and Explanations:
(A) Assume that the investment will be recovered out of the earliest tax benefits ap-
plied against estimated tax payments on a quarterly basis, commencing with the third
quarter of 1970, without consideration for lost earnings during the period of such recovery.
(B) Represents the amount of benefits to be retained by the investor, after return of
capital, which are not required for sinking fund for future payment of taxes.
(C) Represents the amount of benefits required to be funded which, with interest com-
pounded quarterly at the indicated rate after tax, will be sufficient to pay the indicated
taxes on a quarterly basis.
(D) Represents the period of investment on a weighted average basis.
(E) Does not include residual value, after applicable taxes.
(F) This technique with its assumptions as stated, is only one of several alternative
methods of analyzing this investment. This illustration indicates that capital will be fully
recovered In about 24 months. Based on financial compound interest and annuity tables,
the above after-tax flows may be considered as resulting in a rate of approximately 213%
during the period of recovery for the original $50,000 investment and the $17,529 excess.
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